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Lawrence J Fossi,* Bryant W. Burke,** and Philip D. Weller***
EVERAL decisions from this Survey period indicate that the Texas
Supreme Court has begun to honor and uphold the intent of con-
senting adults, as that intent is expressed in their contracts.' To those
who have reviewed court decisions during the 1980's, this approach may
seem novel. Indeed, a historian in some far removed future, chancing upon
several volumes of the Southwestern Reporter from the past decade, might
conclude that in those olden days Texas was overrun with heavily armed
bankers who made a practice of breaking into the offices of real estate devel-
opers and forcing their hapless captives to borrow money.
The Texas Supreme Court's new approach, which began with the 1988
elections, has some rather stark consequences for mortgage lenders and bor-
rowers. If a borrower says "I promise to pay," then he will likely be re-
quired to do just that. If a guarantor says "I unconditionally and primarily
guarantee payment of," then a court may take him at his word. 2 And if a
real estate developer claims that he and his lender had a special relationship
giving rise to a fiduciary duty, then he will need more than a banker's Christ-
mas card to prove his point.3
The high court's decisions are emblematic of a more pervasive mood dur-
ing the Survey period that saw the Texas bench become less inclined to ven-
ture outside the settled pathways of the common law. Perhaps the courts
were inspired by the more cautious approach of the high court, or perhaps
they were weary from the past decade's frenzy of judicial legislation.
Whatever the reason, judges seemed content to return to the ways of simpler
days when doctrinal changes were gradual and incremental, and when the
hallmark of judicial craftsmanship was a decision which flowed naturally
*B.A., Rice University, J.D., Yale Law School. Partner, Vinson & Elkins, Dallas.
* B.A., Colgate University, J.D., University of Texas School of Law. Asociate, Vinson
& Elkins, Dallas
*** B.A., Bowling Green State University, J.D., University of Houston. Partner, Vinson
& Elkins, Dallas
1. See, eg., infra text accompanying notes 80-93 (discussing FDIC v. Coleman, 795
S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1990)); infra text accompanying notes 354-62 (discussing Rhodes v. Cahill,
34 Tex. Sup. CL J. 33 (Oct. 10, 1990)).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 80-93 (discussing FDIC v. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d
706 (Tex. 1990)); infra text accompanying 104-14 (discussing Preston Ridge Financial Services
Corporation v. Tyler, 796 S.W.2d 772 (rex. App.-Dallas 1990, n.w.h.)).
3. See, eg., infra text accompanying note 94 (discussing FDIC v. Blanton, 918 F.2d 524
(5th Cir. 1990)); infra text accompanying notes 80-93 (discussing FDIC v. Coleman, 795
S.W.2d 706 (rex. 1990)).
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and inevitably from its antecedents rather than one which with blaring trum-
pets heralded the dawning of a more perfect age.4 This is not to deny that
new and sometimes dubious law was made during the Survey period, 5 or
that some of the opinions reflect less careful preparation than others.6 By
and large, though, a review of the Survey cases suggests that judicial mod-
esty is once again the spirit of the day, leaving one to hope that Texas juris-
prudence can again become, if not wholly predictable, at least less
capricious.
I. MORTGAGES
A. Foreclosures and Deficiency Judgments
In 1988, the Beaumont court of appeals suggested in Halter v. Allied
Merchants Bank 7 that a regularly conducted mortgage foreclosure sale
might be invalid if the lienholder or its surrogate was the purchaser and
there existed a "significant disparity" between the purchase price and the
property's value.8 The language in Halter, even though only dicta, was nev-
ertheless startling because it ran counter to a century of Texas case law hold-
ing that mere inadequacy of sales price, absent some irregularity in the
foreclosure proceedings that contributed to the inadequacy, would not jus-
tify setting aside a foreclosure sale.9 The Halter decision was quickly seized
upon by lawyers seeking to challenge foreclosure proceedings, and courts
throughout Texas were confronted with the decision of whether to follow
Halter. At stake was nothing less than the continuing vitality of the private
sale remedy, with all of the likely consequences to the mortgage credit mar-
ket that would attend a curtailment of that remedy.
During 1989 only one court, the El Paso court of appeals in Olney Savings
& Loan Association v. Farmers Market of Odessa,10 seemed inclined to follow
Halter. Meanwhile, the Halter decision was receiving a sound thrashing by
other courts, most particularly by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in Savers Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Reetz. I The Fifth
Circuit, in a carefully researched opinion, concluded that Halter was unsup-
ported by any pertinent authority, was at odds with well-established case law
4. A comparison of, for example, Davidow v. Inwood North Professional Group-Phase
I, 747 S.W.2d 373 (rex. 1988), with FDIC v. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1990), or
Rhodes v. Cahill, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 33 (Oct. 10, 1990), reveals two entirely different judicial
temperaments at work.
5. See, eg., infra text accompanying notes 166-69 (discussing Prappas v. Meyerland
Community Improvement Assoc., 788 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied)).
6. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 227-42 (discussing Don Hill Constr. Co. v.
Dealers Elec. Supply Co., 790 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, n.w.h.).
7. 751 S.W.2d 286 (rex. App.-Beaumont 1988, writ denied).
8. Id. at 288 (quoting Lee v. Sabine Bank, 708 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (deficiency resulting from marshall's sale of boat).
9. See, e-g., American Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Musick, 531 S.W.2d 581, 587 (Tex. 1975);
Tarrant Say. Ass'n v. Lucky Homes, Inc., 390 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex. 1965); Sparkman v.
McWhirter, 263 S.W.2d 832, 837 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1953, writ ref'd).
10. 764 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied).
11. 888 F.2d 1497 (5th Cir. 1989).
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and statutory law, and was in all events the "purest dicta." 12
The attack on Halter continued during this Survey period, and all three
courts addressing the issue rolled out the Fifth Circuit's Savers Federal deci-
sion as artillery. In Greater Southwest Office Park, Ltd. v. Texas Commerce
Bank National Association 13 a lender purchased property at a non-judicial
foreclosure sale for approximately $4.85 million, prompting the borrower's
suit alleging that the fair market value at the time of the foreclosure was
approximately $10.53 million, making the bank's bid "unconscionably
low." 14 The Houston appeals court, noting that the borrower made no claim
that the foreclosure sale was in any way irregular, cited American Savings &
Loan Association v. Musick's for the proposition that inadequacy of consid-
eration absent some procedural irregularity in the sale that caused or con-
tributed to the inadequacy is not grounds for setting the sale aside. The
Greater Southwest borrower attempted to distinguish the Musick rule by
contending that it was inapplicable to actions for damages. The borrower
relied upon the Olney and Halter holdings. The Houston court of appeals
emphatically declined to follow those cases, and instead strongly seconded
the views of the dissenting opinion in Olney and of the Fifth Circuit in Savers
Federal.16 The court of appeals also held that the lender's policy of bidding
70% of a property's value, but not more than the debt owing, was not ac-
tionable under either contract or tort, and it rejected the borrower's claim
that the borrower's subjective trust in the lender was sufficient to give rise to
a special trust or fiduciary relationship.17
The second case, First Nationwide Bank v. Summer House Joint Venture,'8
arose out of a summary judgment granted to a lender in its efforts to collect
a $5.6 million deficiency following a mortgage foreclosure. Most of the deci-
sion focuses on questions of federal procedure; however, a portion of the
decision, relying on Savers Federal, reiterates the Texas rule that mere inade-
quacy of sales price does not void an otherwise regularly conducted non-
judicial foreclosure sale. 19
The final Survey case in the area, Pentad Joint Venture v. First National
Bank of LaGrange,20 is the most curious of the three. The Austin court of
appeals initially adhered closely to the Musick, Savers Federal, and Greater
Southwest line of authority in affirming a summary judgment in favor of a
lender despite the guarantors' claims that 1) the foreclosure sales price was
grossly inadequate, 2) the lender's failure to disclose before the sale that it
would bid only 70% of the property's fair market value was unfair and con-
tributed to the inadequacy of the sales price, and 3) the relationship between
12. Id. at 1503-07.
13. 786 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
14. Id. at 388.
15. 531 S.W.2d at 581 (Tex. 1975).
16. Greater Southwest, 786 S.W.2d at 389-90.
17. Id. at 390-91.
18. 902 F.2d 1197 (5th Cir. 1990).
19. Id. at 1201.
20. 797 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. App.-Austin, 1990, no writ).
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the mortgagee and mortgagor was one of trust, giving rise to a duty of good
faith and an obligation on the part of the mortgagee to obtain the highest
possible price at foreclosure. 21 In response, however, to the summary dis-
missal of the guarantors' counterclaims for breach of a duty of good faith
and fair dealing, common law fraud, and DTPA unconscionability, the ap-
peals court reversed and remanded, saying that the lender had offered no
conclusive summary judgment evidence of the property's fair market
value.22 If, as the court had affirmed only two pages earlier, the adequacy of
foreclosure sales proceeds counts for naught absent some evidence of a de-
fect or irregularity in the sale procedure, and if it was clear that no such
defect or irregularity had even been alleged, then one wonders why the court
held the door open to the counterclaims. It seems that Halter, although
roughed up a good bit, still has some life in it, and may continue to cause
mischief or do good, depending on one's perspective, until a definitive pro-
nouncement from the Texas Supreme Court.
Two other Survey cases in this area, FDIC v. Blanton 23 and Georgetown
Associates, Ltd. v. Home Federal Savings & Loan Association,24 are notewor-
thy because they suggest an answer to the question of how inadequate sales
proceeds must be in order to be regarded as "grossly inadequate." In Blan-
ton a federal court jury found defects in the foreclosure sales of five proper-
ties, and further found that the defects contributed to the sale of each
property at a grossly inadequate price. The judge had instructed the jurors
that a grossly inadequate price would have to be so low as "to shock a cor-
rect mind, and thereby raise a presumption that fraud attended the
purchase." The judge let stand the jury finding as to four of the properties,
but granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the fifth, and
credited the borrower only with the actual sales price for that property. The
judge concluded that, as a matter of law, a sales price of 62.3% of the mar-
ket price is not shocking.25
The Fifth Circuit approved the jury instruction on the definition of grossly
inadequate, and also sustained his judgment n.o.v. as to the fifth property. It
noted that Texas authority supports the view that a sales price of more than
60% of market value is not grossly inadequate 26 and, while cautioning
against a mechanical application of the 60% test, found that the evidence
supported the trial judge's ruling.
In Georgetown Associates, Ltd. the Houston court of appeals concluded
that a foreclosure sales price equal to 74% of the appraised value and 84%
of the resale price was not grossly inadequate and, even if it were, there was
21. Id. at 95-97.
22. Id. at 98.
23. 918 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1990).
24. 795 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
25. Id. at 531.
26. Id. at 531-32 (citing Charter Nat. Bank-Houston v. Stevens, 781 S.W.2d 368, 375
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied)) (cases cited therein indicate findings of
gross inadequacy typically fall far below 60% line); Citizens Nat. Bank of Lubbock v. Maxey,
461 S.W.2d 138, 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (sales price of stocks
that exceeded 60% of market value is, as a matter of law, not grossly inadequate).
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no evidence of any irregularity in the foreclosure sale that would justify ex-
amining the price's adequacy.27 The Houston court attacked the approach
of Halter and Olney for being contrary to the settled law of Musick.28
Ironically, the approach of Halter and Olney may carry the day after all if
legislation that is pending at the time of this article's publication is ulti-
mately enacted. The proposed legislation29 would limit mortgage deficiency
judgments to the difference between the outstanding indebtedness and the
property's fair market value at the time of foreclosure, with such value to be
judicially determined. The legislation, which would be added to the Texas
Property Code as section 51.003, would also require that a debtor be
credited with any proceeds received by the lender from private mortgage
insurance. A similar proposal was approved by both houses of the legisla-
ture during the 1990 session, but was vetoed by Governor Clements.30
B. The D'oench, Duhme Doctrine
The growing reluctance of Texas courts to protect borrowers from their
written undertakings has an interesting federal law parallel: the increasing
prominence of the so-called D'Oench, Duhme doctrine.31 During the Survey
period the Dallas court of appeals decided two cases, FSLIC v. Stone-Liberty
Land Associates32 and FDIC/Manager Fund v. Larsen,33 that extend the
sweep of the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine. Both cases held the FDIC can,
upon becoming the owner of a failing financial institution's assets, assert the
D'Oench, Duhme defense on appeal, even though such defense was not avail-
able to or asserted by the financial institution itself at trial.
The facts in Stone and Larsen are similar. In response to legal proceed-
ings or a foreclosure action to collect indebtedness, the borrower (in Stone)
27. Georgetown Assoc-, Ltd., 795 S.W.2d at 255.
28. Id. at 254-55.
29. Tex. H.B. 169, 72nd Leg. (1991).
30. Tex. S.B. 452, 71st Leg. (1990).
31. The doctrine takes its name from D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447
(1942), which held that secret agreements, such as those designed to deceive creditors or the
public authority or tending to have that effect, cannot be asserted as a defense in a suit by the
FDIC because they would tend to deceive the banking authorities. Id. at 459-60. Congress
codified D'Oench in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, § 2(13)(e), 64 Stat. 889, as
amended by, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(e) (West 1989), which provides:
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the interest of the [FDIC] in
any asset acquired by it under this section or section 1821 of this title, either as
security for a loan or by purchase or as receiver of any insured depository insti-
tution, shall be valid against the [FDIC] unless such agreement -
(1) is in writing,
(2) was executed by the depository institution and any person claiming an ad-
verse interest thereunder, including the obligor, contemporaneously with the
acquisition of the asset by the depository institution,
(3) was approved by the board of directors of the depository institution or its
loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said
board or committee, and
(4) has been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official record of
the depository institution.
32. 787 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ granted).
33. 793 S.W.2d 37 (rex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ granted) (relying on Stone precedent).
1991]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
or a subordinate lienholder (in Larsen) challenges the collection proceeding
by claiming that the financial institution has violated various oral agree-
ments and representations made by it or its agents after the loan agreements
were signed. Following a trial court verdict against the financial institution,
the FDIC succeeds to the assets and liabilities of the institution and raises on
appeal the D'Oench, Duhme (or section 1823(e)) defense: that no agreement
which tends to diminish or defeat the right, title, and interest of the FDIC in
any asset acquired by the FDIC shall be valid against the FDIC unless the
listed requirements of section 1823(e) are met. 34 The effect of the D'Oench,
Duhme defense will be to eviscerate essentially the entire case of the bor-
rower or lienholder, and the question becomes whether the FDIC may raise
the defense for the first time on appeal.
In answering that question affirmatively, the Stone and Larsen courts re-
lied heavily on sections 1821(d)(13)(A) and (B) of the recently enacted Fi-
nancial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989.35
Section 1821(d)(13)(A) provides that the FDIC shall abide by any final un-
appealable judgment of any court of competent jurisdiction that was ren-
dered before the appointment of the FDIC as conservator or receiver.
Section 1821(d)(13)(B) provides that in the event of any appealable judg-
ment, the FDIC shall have the rights and remedies that were generally avail-
able to the insured depository institution before the conservator or receiver
was appointed as well as the rights and remedies available to the FDIC in its
corporate capacity, including all appellate rights.
Several courts which have examined the question, including the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in a case during this Survey period, have concluded
that the D'Oench, Duhme defense is not available on appeal.3 6 The Stone
and Larsen decisions took issue with these holdings. First, the Dallas court
of appeals case rejected a conclusion from the federal cases that a trial judg-
ment voiding an asset leaves no asset for the receiver. Such a conclusion,
said the Dallas court, ignores the fact that an appealable judgment might be
reversed, and the possibility of reversal means that economic value remains
in the asset.37 The Dallas court also disapproved of reasoning in the federal
cases that the outstanding trial court judgment itself provided a bank record
that the promissory notes at issue were void. That reasoning, said the court,
takes no account of the U.S. Supreme Court's holding that knowledge of the
FDIC is no defense to the D'Oench, Duhme defense,38 and also fails to com-
prehend that a trial court judgment that is entered years after the disputed
loan transactions falls far short of the requirements of D'Oench, Duhme and
section 1823(e) that the bank records be contemporaneous with the
34. See supra note 31.
35. Federal Deposit Insurance Act 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1821(d)(13)(A) & (B) (1989).
36. Thurman v. FSLIC, 889 F.2d 1441, 1447 (5th Cir. 1990); see Olney Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Trinity Bane Say. Ass'n, 885 F.2d 266, 275 (5th Cir. 1989); Grubb v. FDIC, 868 F.2d
1151, 1158-59 (10th Cir. 1989).
37. Stone, 787 S.W.2d at 483-84; Larsen, 793 S.W.2d at 41 (citing Stone's rationale).




The Dallas court of appeals also rejected a conclusion from the federal
cases that section 1821(d)(13)(B) gives conservators and receivers standing
to pursue all appeals but does not grant any new substantive rights on ap-
peal.40 The Dallas court reasoned that one can reach such a conclusion only
by construing just subpart (B) of section 1821(d)(13), and ignoring alto-
gether subpart (A).41 The FDIC surely must abide by final unappealable
judgments, but it is expressly empowered to assert a vast panoply of rights
and remedies so long as the judgment is still appealable.42 The court also
held that the FDIC has such rights and remedies even though the federal
defenses were neither raised at trial nor preserved for review on appeal.43
This is not shocking, the court said, because the federal defenses were un-
available to the financial institutions at trial.44
As a final point, the Dallas court of appeals noted that the phrase "no
agreement" in section 1823(e) has been broadly construed to mean no part of
the parties' bargain, as reflected in the express or implied conditions upon
their performance.45 "The essence of the D'Oench rule is that the FDIC is
entitled to rely, to the exclusion of any extraneous matters, on the official
bank records that set forth the rights and obligations of the bank and those
to whom the bank lends money." 46 Hence, it matters not that the borrower
or lienholder frames its claims as arising under agreements, or resulting from
misrepresentations, or as constituting defenses or affirmative claims. To the
extent such claims are based on matters extraneous to bank records, they
may not be asserted.47
Whether the views of the Dallas court of appeals will carry the day re-
mains to be seen. In light of the large dollar amounts at issue and the clear
conflict among the courts, it may be that the Supreme Court of the United
States will write the final chapter.
C, Wraparound Mortgages
Hampton v. Minton,48 a wraparound note case relying on last year's Texas
Supreme Court decisions in Summers v. Consolidated Capital Special
Trust49 and Lee v. Key West Towers, Inc.,50 seems to confirm that the
Zeitgeist of the 1990's is a world away from that of the 1980's. The Hamp-
ton decision reveals a court hard at work to apply precedent faithfully and
39. Stone, 787 S.W.2d at 483-84; Larsen, 793 S.W.2d at 41-42.
40. See Thurman v. FDIC, 889 F.2d 1441, 1447 (5th Cir. 1990).
41. Stone, 787 S.W.2d at 484; Larsen, 793 S.W.2d at 42.
42. Id.
43. Stone, 787 S.W.2d at 484.
44. Larsen, 793 S.W.2d at 43.
45. Larsen, 793 S.W.2d at 43 (citing Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 93-94 (1987)).
46. Stone, 787 S.W.2d at 490.
47. Stone, 787 S.W.2d at 490; Larsen, 793 S.W.2d at 44.
48. 785 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied).
49. 783 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. 1989).
50. 783 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. 1989).
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disinclined to allow sophistical subtleties to undercut the contractual intent
of the litigants.
Minton, the holder of the wraparound note, declared the wraparound note
in default and posted for foreclosure after the makers of the note failed to
pay insurance and taxes. The foreclosure sale was delayed by the makers'
bankruptcy filing, and meanwhile Minton himself defaulted on the wrapped
note, resulting in a foreclosure sale by the holder of that prior note. Minton
sued the makers of the wraparound note for specific performance of their
obligations under the wraparound note and for damages equal to the differ-
ence between the balance of the wraparound note and the amount bid by the
first lienholder at foreclosure. On appeal from a judgment for Minton, the
makers of the wraparound note contended that Minton could recover noth-
ing because 1) their deed from Minton required him to make payments on
the wrapped note even after their default on the wraparound note, and 2)
Minton, by suing for specific enforcement of the wraparound note, did not
treat the makers' breach as a repudiation of the contract, but rather kept the
contract alive, thereby waiving Minton's excuse for failing to keep the
wrapped note current.51
The Austin court of appeals acknowledged the general rule that a party
seeking to recover damages for breach of an agreement must prove that he
has performed all of his own obligations under the agreement. That rule is
inapplicable, however, in instances when the other party has either repudi-
ated its duty to perform or has made a breach of such materiality as to indi-
cate an intention to repudiate.52 Here, said the court, the defaults by the
makers were so material as to evidence an intent to repudiate. Thus, Min-
ton's breach was excused by the prior breach of the makers, and did not
preclude Minton's collection of damages.53
The makers' second argument was more subtle. Texas courts have held
that a party who elects to treat a contract as continuing deprives himself of
any excuse for ceasing performance on his own part.54 The makers of the
wraparound note argued that Minton's suit for specific performance was tan-
tamount to an election to treat the wraparound note as a continuing con-
tract. The appeals court disagreed. It said that Minton's failure to seek
rescission of the contract did not indicate an intent to keep the contractual
obligations alive on both sides. 55 The court explained that the rule requiring
a non-breaching party to "accept" a breaching party's repudiation has been
narrowly applied, and generally only in the context of anticipatory repudia-
tion.56 In Minton the makers of the wraparound note had not anticipatorily
repudiated; rather they had materially defaulted. 57 Moreover, the accelera-
tion of the debt and the posting for foreclosure were reliable indicia of Min-
51. Hampton, 785 S.W.2d at 857.
52. Id. at 857-58 (citing Glass v. Anderson, 596 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Tex. 1980)).
53. Hampton, 785 S.W.2d at 858.
54. See Hanks v. GAB Business Serv., Inc., 644 S.W.2d 707, 708 (Tex. 1982).





ton's intent to accept the makers' repudiation.58 The makers further
contended that Minton's failure specifically to plead excuse barred Minton
from asserting that the makers' default excused Minton's failure to keep the
first lien note current. The appeals court skirted the merits of the makers'
claim by noting that Minton's failure had not been excepted to in writing
before the judgment was entered, as required by Rule 90 of the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure.59
The makers then argued that Minton's failure to keep his promise to make
timely payments on the first lien note breached a covenant of title and consti-
tuted a failure of consideration. The court saw the matter differently. It
said that if Minton had defaulted in a circumstance where the makers con-
tinued to perform under the wraparound note, then there would have been a
failure of consideration, not because of any breach of a covenant of title, but
rather by reason of breach of contract.6° The court's focus on the contract
between the makers and Minton, and its view of the covenants in the deed as
"memorials of the mutual promises between the vendor and vendee, ' ' 61 is in
line with the supreme court's approach in Summers and Lee. The makers
also urged that Minton's promise to pay the wrapped note amounted to a
covenant against encumbrances, and that Minton's default breached the cov-
enant. The appeals court held, however, that such a covenant is breached, if
at all, only on execution and delivery of a deed.62 Finally, the makers
claimed they were wrongfully deprived of notice of the foreclosure by the
first lienholder. The appeals court disagreed, noting that the makers' right
to cure defaults under the wrapped indebtedness was specifically limited, by
the language of the deed, to circumstances in which the makers were not
themselves in default.63
D. Mortgages Generally
Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Lawrence Investments, Inc.64 arose after
two different parties purchased the identical property at two simultaneous
foreclosure sales. The case affirms some hoary authority on the doctrine of
equitable subrogation, and strengthens the position of lenders whose loan
proceeds are used to satisfy debt secured by senior liens. Lawrence
purchased property in exchange for a purchase money note and lien, and
then sold the property to a company called Allibhai in exchange for a wrap-
around note secured by a wraparound lien. After a tax lien was filed against
the property, Allibhai obtained a bank loan whose proceeds were used to
satisfy the tax lien, repay the original purchase money note, and pay for new
construction. Allibhai in turn sold the property, and the ultimate owner
defaulted on the Lawrence wraparound note and the bank note. When Law-
58. Id.
59. Hampton, 785 S.W.2d at 858-59.
60. Id. at 859.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 859-60 (citing Beaumont v. Moore, 146 Tex. 46, 202 S.W.2d 448 (1947)).
63. Hampton, 785 S.W.2d at 860.
64. 782 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, writ ref'd).
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rence initiated foreclosure proceedings, Lawrence and the bank crossed
swords about the seniority of their respective liens. The bank assigned its
lien to Chicago Title, which had issued a mortgagee policy to the bank. Chi-
cago Title and Lawrence conducted simultaneous foreclosure sales, and each
then claimed to own the property. On cross-motions for summary judg-
ment, the trial court ruled in favor of Lawrence.65
In reversing, the Fort Worth appeals court dusted off the venerable doc-
trine of equitable subrogation. Texas definitively adopted the doctrine in
1895, when the state's highest court announced that a person paying the
debt of another person would succeed to all of that other person's rights,
liens, and priorities, provided that the paying party was not a mere volunteer
but rather was protecting an interest which would be jeopardized if the debt
were not paid off.66 The appeals court held the liens that were satisfied by
the bank loan were both senior liens. 67 In conditioning its loan upon the
satisfaction of those liens, the bank was no mere volunteer; rather, it was
protecting the superiority of a legitimate business loan, and was therefore
subrogated to the rights of the senior lienholders. 68 Chicago Title succeeded
to those same rights, liens, and priorities by reason of its status as assignee of
the bank note and lien, and thus acquired the property at the foreclosure sale
free and clear of Lawrence's claims. 69 The issue of division of sales proceeds
was not before the appeals court, but the court did note that the priority
from subrogation existed only to the extent that the bank's funds were used
to pay off the prior liens, and not to the additional extent of loan proceeds
used for new construction. 70
Scott v. Schneider Estate Trust.71 also provided a lesson in common law
precepts, this time involving the doctrine of equitable redemption. The es-
tate trust sold two lots to an improvident purchaser in exchange for two
notes and two liens. The improvident purchaser sold the property to a hard-
luck buyer, who executed separate notes and liens. The hard-luck buyer
made payments to the purchaser, who in turn was supposed to forward most
of the payment on to the estate trust to satisfy the superior debt. The buyer
dutifully made payments; unbeknownst to him, however, the improvident
purchaser was pocketing the funds, causing a default under the first lien
debts. When the buyer learned that the estate trust had posted for foreclo-
sure, it sought to prevent the proceedings by filing suit for equitable redemp-
tion. In affirming a trial court judgment for the estate trust, the appeals
court noted that the doctrine of equitable redemption requires a petitioner to
submit three proofs.72 First, he must demonstrate that he has a legal or
equitable interest in the property subject to the mortgage. Second, he must
65. Id. at 333-34.
66. Faires v. Cockrill, 88 Tex. 428, 31 S.W. 190 (1895).
67. Chicago Title, 782 S.W.2d at 334.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 334-35.
70. Id.
71. 783 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
72. Id. at 28.
(Vol. 45
REAL PROPERTY
prove that he is "ready, able or willing" to redeem the property by paying off
the existing liens.73 Third, he must assert his equity of redemption before a
foreclosure sale occurs.74 In this case, the hard-luck buyer met the first and
third tests, but failed to prove that he was prepared to pay off the notes held
by the estate trusts. 75
Schultz v. Weaver 76 is a case whose holding, on first reading, appears so
self-evident as hardly to merit another thought. A closer look, though,
raises an intriguing question. In Schultz the original buyer of land gave the
original seller, Weaver, a purchase money note and lien. The note provided
that the maker had no personal liability for payment, and that Weaver's sole
recourse upon default was to take back the property. The original buyer, in
turn sold the land to Schultz; the warranty deed included an assumption by
Schultz of payment under the original note "according to the terms
thereof."77 When Schultz defaulted, Weaver sued Schultz on the note, argu-
ing that Schultz was now personally liable for payment, and the trial court
awarded Weaver a judgment.
The Austin appeals court reversed. It noted that an assuming party is
generally liable to the same extent as the party from whom it assumes.78 It
rested its holding, however, on the language in the warranty deed that quali-
fied the assumption language: the assumption was to pay the note in accord-
ance with its terms, and its terms were non-recourse.7 9 The "according to
the terms thereof" language surely helps rescue the otherwise shoddy as-
sumption language in the deed. Even without that language, though, it
seems that the result should be the same. Weaver was not a party to the
transaction in which Schultz assumed payment, and gave no consideration
for the promise, and should not become a third party beneficiary of any
assumption.
II. GUARANTIES
In FDIC v. Coleman 80 the officers and owners of a corporation had guar-
anteed the corporation's mortgage loan. In the written guaranties, the guar-
antors waived diligence on the part of the lender in collecting the debt, and
agreed that the lender could, in its sole discretion, exercise or refrain from
exercising its rights under the mortgage without in any manner diminishing
the guarantors' obligations. Six weeks before the note's maturity date, the
corporation filed a bankruptcy petition under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code. About six months later, the lender sued the guarantors and sought to
73. Id. (citing Houston v. Shear, 210 S.W. 976, 981 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919, writ dism'd)).
74. Schreider Estate, 783 S.W.2d at 28.
75. Id. The record was rather sketchy on why the hard-luck buyer's tender was insuffi-
cient. Because the appellant failed to submit a statement of facts as part of the appeal, the
appeals court assumed that the evidence adduced at trial supported the trial court's conclusion
that the tender was insufficient.
76. 780 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, no writ).
77. Id. at 324-25.
78. Id. at 325.
79. Id.
80. 795 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1990).
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lift the bankruptcy stay in order to foreclose the mortgage lien. Shortly
thereafter, the lender became insolvent and was taken over by the FDIC,
which succeeded to the lender's rights. Soon after the FDIC's succession,
and about a year after the bankruptcy filing, the guarantors' attorney wrote
the FDIC. The attorney claimed that the mortgaged property was worth
approximately the outstanding balance of the note, and requested a meeting
to discuss a proposal whereby the guarantors would arrange for the bank-
rupt corporation to "abandon" the property to the FDIC. There was no
evidence of whether the requested meeting occurred or whether the guaran-
tors took any other steps to sell the property.
About twenty-one months after the maker's bankruptcy, the FDIC ob-
tained bankruptcy court approval to proceed with its foreclosure. Ten
months later, the FDIC sold the property at foreclosure for $357,000, leav-
ing a mortgage note deficiency of $486,000. The FDIC then sought sum-
mary judgment for the deficiency against the guarantors. The guarantors
defended by claiming that the FDIC had a duty to act in good faith and to
pursue and protect the mortgage collateral, and that a fact question existed
as to whether the FDIC breached those duties. In particular, the guarantors
claimed that the FDIC delayed its foreclosure during a period when it knew
that property values were declining, thus increasing the guarantors' liabili-
ties. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the FDIC, and
the Midland court of appeals reversed, holding that the FDIC owed a duty
of good faith to the guarantors and therefore a fact questioned remained
about whether the delay was a breach of the duty.8 1
The Texas Supreme Court doubted whether Texas Uniform Commercial
Code section 1.20382 imposed a duty of good faith on a mortgage lender in
its dealings with a guarantor, and stated that even assuming section 1.203
applied to mortgage guaranties, it requires only honesty in fact, and not
diligence.8 3
The guarantors cited several high court decisions in support of the propo-
sition that a mortgage lender owes its guarantors a duty of good faith under
state law.84 The Texas Supreme Court distinguished those decisions as cases
involving shared trust or imbalance of bargaining power.85 By contrast, said
the court, the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee does not ordinarily
involve a duty of good faith, nor does that of creditor and guarantor.8 6 The
court noted that in this case, thb guarantors had not even asserted any spe-
cial relationship with the lender or its successor. 87 The court distinguished a
81. Id. at 707. The appeals court opinion is reported at 762 S.W.2d 243, 245.
82. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.203 (Vernon 1978).
83. Id. at 708 (citing Riley v. First State Bank, 469 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
84. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d at 708 (citing Aranda v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210(Tex. 1988); Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (rex. 1987);
Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984)).
85. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d at 708-09.




Fifth Circuit decision cited by the guarantors, Frederick v. United States,88
as one requiring that a foreclosure sale be conducted fairly. Here, said the
Coleman court, the claim is that the sale did not take place soon enough, not
that it wasn't fair.89
Aside from the paucity of authority supporting the creation of a duty of
good faith, the high court also found compelling policy reasons for not creat-
ing such a duty. For example, the guarantors, as controlling principals of
the debtor corporation, could have caused the corporation to sell the prop-
erty if, as their counsel claimed when he talked with the FDIC, the prop-
erty's value approximated the amount of the debt. The guarantors instead
chose to seek bankruptcy protection.9" Moreover, imposing such a duty on
a mortgage lender would impose the impossible task of foreseeing the future
of real estate values.91 The court noted that, according to appraisal evidence
introduced by the guarantors, property values actually rose during a two
month interval after the bankruptcy filing. If a lender were required to
hasten its foreclosure sale during the falling market, said the court, then why
not also require it to tarry during a rising market? In short, "it is difficult
enough to determine when it is best to foreclose to protect one's own inter-
ests; it is virtually impossible to know when it is best to protect others'
interests."19 2
Finally, the court held, even if a mortgage lender owed a duty of good
faith to guarantors of the mortgage debt, in this case any such duty was
waived by the provisions in the guaranties which afforded the lender com-
plete discretion in deciding when and whether to enforce rights and which
waived the lender's diligence. 93
The supreme court's Coleman decision was dispositive in FDIC v. Blan-
ton,9 4 wherein the Fifth Circuit rejected a claim by a borrower that the
FDIC's delay in foreclosing impaired the value of the collateral and thereby
breached a duty of good faith. Coleman was also pivotal in Georgetown As-
sociates, Ltd. v. Home Federal Savings & Loan Association,9" wherein the
Houston Court of Appeals declined to acknowledge the existence of a duty
of good faith on the part of a mortgagee, stating instead that the mortgagee's
only duty is to foreclose in accordance with the statutory procedures. 96
Cocke v. Meridian Savings Association 97 involved a claim similar to that
made in Coleman except that the syntax was different. In Cocke a lender
88. 386 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1967).
89. Coleman, 787 S.W.2d at 709. Dissenting from the Coleman opinion were Justices
Mauzy, Spears, and Ray, who felt that the FDIC owed "a duty of commercial reasonable-
ness," and therefore the case should go to the jury to determine the FDIC had breached that
duty. Id. at 710-11 (Mauzy, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 709.
91. Id. at 710.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 710.
94. 918 F.2d 524, 530-31 (5th Cir. 1990).
95. 795 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
96. Id. at 255-56.
97. 778 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
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sued the debtor for a deficiency remaining after a real property foreclosure.
The debtor defended by contending that the lender had a duty to mitigate its
damages and, by selling the property 10 months after the earliest possibility,
during which interval the property lost $300,000 in value, had failed to fulfill
its duty. The Corpus Christi appeals court curtly declined to create a duty
to mitigate in property law,98 citing the rather inscrutable authority of
Brown v. RepublicBank First National.99
In Waite v. BancTexas-Houston, N.A. 100 four mortgage note guarantors
sought to overturn a summary judgment against them by claiming that a fact
issue existed as to whether the bank had failed to use reasonable efforts in
obtaining bids at a foreclosure sale. The court gave short shrift to the claim,
calling it "without merit."101 The Waite court cited American Savings and
Loan Association v. Musick 10 2 for the proposition that disparity between
purchase price and fair market value is actionable only if there existed an
irregularity in the foreclosure sale that contributed to the disparity.103
Preston Ridge Financial Services Corp. v. Tyler 1o4poses the following ex-
ercise in contract construction: If 1) a guarantor guarantees payment of a
portion of a loan above a certain amount (for instance, all indebtedness in
excess of $735,000), 2) the lender forecloses its lien on property securing the
loan before pursuing the guarantor, and 3) the foreclosure proceeds are suffi-
cient to reduce the loan below the threshold amount, is the guarantor still
liable?
The guaranty at issue provided that the guarantor would pay "when due"
the sum of all interest on the loan and the amount by which the outstanding
principal balance of the loan exceeded $735,000.10s When the borrower de-
faulted, the lender foreclosed its liens against the collateral and applied the
foreclosure proceeds to the loan. After such application, the principal bal-
ance of the loan was less than $735,000. The lender demanded that the
guarantor pay the remaining loan balance. The guarantor refused, claiming
its liability was extinguished by the application of the foreclosure proceeds to
the loan. The trial court agreed and granted the guarantor's motion for
summary judgment. 0 6 On appeal, the lender urged that the guarantor's lia-
bility was established when the outstanding indebtedness was due, on the
date of acceleration. The guarantor responded that the guaranty required
payment of the guaranteed indebtedness "immediately upon demand";
therefore, his liability should be determined when the lender demanded pay-
ment.' 0 7 The guarantor argued that the lender had extinguished his liability
98. Id. at 520.
99. 766 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1988). In dicta, a majority of the majority and dissenting judges
actually voiced approval for a duty to mitigate damages.
100. 792 S.W.2d 538, (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1990, n.w.h.).
101. Id. at 541.
102. 531 S.W.2d 581 (rex. 1975).
103. Waite, 792 S.W.2d at 541.
104. 796 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, n.w.h.).
105. Id. at 774.
106. Id.
107. The guarantor relied on the following language to support its position: "Guarantor
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by applying the foreclosure proceeds to the loan before demanding payment.
The Dallas appeals court noted that the guaranty's introductory para-
graph clearly evidenced that the guaranty was executed to supplement the
other collateral.103 The court then construed the guaranty in light of what it
regarded as the parties' intent to make the lender whole if the borrower de-
faulted.109 Thereafter, it was downhill for the guarantor. The court found
that the provision requiring payment "immediately upon demand" estab-
lished when payment from the guarantor was due and not when the guaran-
tor's liability accrued.' 10 The court construed the guaranty in conjunction
with the terms of the promissory note, and held that the guarantor's liability
accrued when the maturity date of the loan was accelerated. I 1
The guarantor also argued that the guaranty provided that all payments
made on the loan should reduce the guaranteed indebtedness. To support
his argument, the guarantor cited the following provision: "If the guaran-
teed portion of the indebtedness is partially satisfied by reason of the election
of Lender to pursue any of the remedies mentioned in this paragraph, Guar-
antor shall remain liable for the balance of the guaranteed portion of the
indebtedness."' 2 The court held that this provision merely assured the
guarantor that, to the extent the lender's exercise of other remedies yielded
proceeds in excess of $735,000, the guarantor would receive credit for those
excess amounts.' 
13
The court's unwillingness to sanction the "anomalous result" that would
occur if the guarantor's arguments were adopted guided its decision. That
is, if the lender elected first to proceed against the guarantor and then to
foreclose its lien against the collateral, the guarantor would be fully liable;
on the other hand, if the lender elected first to foreclose its lien against the
collateral and then to proceed against the guarantor, the guarantor's liability
would be extinguished." 4
III. LANDLORD AND TENANT
A. Construction and Interpretation
In both last year's Survey and this one, we have heaped high praise on the
Texas Supreme Court, rejoicing in its new-found inclination to honor rather
than frustrate the intent of contracting parties. In Bockelmann v.
Marynick, I 5 however, the court has strayed somewhat from the straight and
narrow. That there was a great temptation to stray is clear from the facts.
hereby agrees that if the Note is not paid by [the borrower] in accordance with its terms ....
then immediately upon demand by (the lender], Guarantor will pay to [the lender] the guaran-
teed portion of the indebtedness .... " Id. at 778.
108. Preston Ridge, 796 S.W.2d at 777-78.
109. Id. at 778.
110. Id. at 778-79.
111. Id. at 779.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 781.
115. 788 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1990).
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The Dallas court of appeals had ruled that a wife who separated from her
husband and left their leased duplex before the end of the lease's original
term was nevertheless liable for holdover rental that the husband failed to
pay, even though the landlord had allowed the husband to defer some rental
by signing a written loan agreement. The court of appeals based its holding
on a lease provision stating that any holding over would create a new year-
to-year tenancy between the landlord and tenant.' 16 In order to escape hold-
over liability, said the court of appeals, the wife needed to notify the landlord
that she no longer held any interest in the property. 117
The Texas Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Phillips
and issued without dissent, reversed. Noting that under common law a
landlord may elect to treat a holdover tenant either as a trespasser or as a
tenant holding under the terms of the original lease, 1 s the court said that
the lease in question incorporated this rule by providing that if the landlord
consents, a new tenancy is created with a one-year term. Thus, said the
court, the language of the lease indicated that the holdover tenancy was a
new one rather than an extension of the old one. Under such circumstances,
only the new tenant was liable. 119
The court's examination of the language in the lease agreement is, per-
haps, a bit too selective. The lease did indeed give the landlord the right to
treat the holding over as a new tenancy, but the lease stated that the new
tenancy would be between the landlord and the tenant, and it identified the
"tenant" as both the husband and the wife.' 20 It is one thing to formulate
common law doctrines that govern the parties' rights in the absence of an
agreement, but it is quite another matter to substitute those doctrines in
place of written contractual undertakings. All things considered, it seems
that the common law does not impose an undue burden on an abandoning
joint tenant by requiring notice to the landlord.121 The Texas Supreme
Court's desire to do good rather than to do right is understandable, but one
wonders what the result would have been had the wife shown up at the
courthouse door demanding to share the leased premises during the holdo-
ver term.
The continuing vitality of the mail box rule was demonstrated in Brown v.
Swift-Eckrich, Inc. 122 The tenant mailed a certified letter exercising a re-
newal option some three days before the required date, but the notice was
not received until after the final date for exercise. The landlord alleged that
the notice was not timely given, and that therefore the option had lapsed.
The El Paso court of appeals held for the tenant, noting that where a lease
116. Id. at 570-71.
117. Id. at 571.
118. Id. (citing Howeth v. Anderson, 25 Tex. 557, 572 (1860)).
119. Id. at 571-72.
120. Id. at 570.
121. In light of the husband's dealings with the landlord during the holdover term, includ-
ing a written loan agreement without the wife's signature, one wonders why no one contended
that the landlord had notice of the cessation of the wife's actual possession.
122. 787 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1990, writ denied).
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specifically provides for giving notice by mail, timely deposit of notice in
compliance with the lease will suffice. 123
The difficulty of determining if a landlord has accepted a surrender of a
lease was at issue in Ingleside Properties v. Red Fish Bay Terminal.124 The
tenant had ceased making rental payments and abandoned the premises after
its subtenant chose not to renew its sublease and moved out. The landlord
notified the tenant that it was not terminating the lease but would continue
to sue for rentals. The landlord also sent a notice to the tenant's former
subtenant trying to intercept payments required to be made for construction
of a warehouse on the premises. The court noted that a surrender results as
a matter of law when the landlord has exercised such dominion over prem-
ises as to reappropriate them with the intention of depriving the tenant of
future rights. 125 In Ingleside, however, the court held that the landlord's
occasional mooring of vessels at a dock that was part of the premises did not
constitute a surrender because the longest term of the landlord's occupancy
was between seven and fourteen days, and most of the occupancy periods
ranged only between twelve and eighteen hours. 126
B. Breaches and Remedies
Assume you are a retailer and you discover that your premises are so
defective that you cannot properly operate your business. After repeated
efforts to obtain repairs you finally withhold rent, though you offer to escrow
it while matters are resolved. This action, coupled with the landlord's desire
to lease your premises to another tenant, finally draws enough attention to
start negotiations. While negotiating for substitute space, though, the land-
lord sends you a demand for delinquent rent and then tells you to ignore the
notice. Finally, while you are on vacation, the landlord enters your prem-
ises, seizes your inventory, and evicts you. Would you be in a litigious
mood? The tenant in Gill Savings Association v. Chair King, Inc. 127 certainly
was, and it found a sympathetic ear in the trial court, which ruled that the
facts supported the tenant's claims for actual and punitive damages resulting
from the eviction. 128 On appeal, the landlord contended that the eviction
was valid because the alleged defects did not justify withholding rent. The
appeals court disagreed, pointing to an extensive list of defects, including
roof leaks and problems with access to air conditioners. 129 The court also
123. Id. at 600 (citing Pruett Jewelers v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 426 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Kamenoff v. Meadows, 457 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1970, no writ)). The court also noted that, in general, strict compliance with
provisions concerning exercise of options is required in the absence of equitable considerations.
Brown, 787 S.W.2d at 601.
124. 791 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
125. Id. at 218-19 (citing, inter alia, Harry Hines Medical Center, Ltd. v. Wilson, 656
S.W.2d 598, 601 (rex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ)).
126. Id. at 219-20.
127. 783 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989) aff'd in part & modified in
part, 797 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1990).
128. 783 S.W.2d at 675.
129. Id. at 677.
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quoted an internal memorandum of the landlord stating "that the general
atmosphere was one of disaster. ' 130 The landlord's demanding rent and
evicting rather than repairing the defects, especially in light of the negotia-
tions with the new tenant, supported a fraud claim and estopped the land-
lord from asserting that the eviction was proper.1 31 The landlord's activity
was also found sufficient to defeat its claim for the withheld rent; however,
because it could not determine how the trial court had determined dam-
ages, 132 the appeals court affirmed liability, and reversed for trial on the
damage issue.1 33 The Texas Supreme Court affirmed as to liability, while
reversing as to part of the attorney's fees issue.134 A final point of interest is
that one of the successful defenses to the landlord's rent counterclaim was
breach of the implied warranty of habitability. The opinion, however, makes
no reference to the seminal case in the area, Davidow v. Inwood North Profes-
sional Group-Phase I.13
Although not utilized in Chair King, Davidow implied warranty of suita-
bility formed part of the basis for an interesting damage suit by a landlord-
owner against its management company alleging negligence in the manage-
ment of an office building. In Henry S. Miller Management Corp. v. Houston
State Associates 136 a building owner recovered lost rentals after a major ten-
ant moved out because of the manager's failure to provide maintenance and
repairs, which was held at trial to constitute a breach of the implied war-
ranty of suitability established in Davidow. On appeal the court noted that
Davidow is not grounded in constructive eviction, and therefore in order to
terminate the lease, the tenant was not required to prove constructive evic-
tion, loss of use, or loss of economic benefit. 137 The management company
argued that, assuming the landlord was entitled to damages, it was entitled
only to lost profits, and not lost rentals. The Houston court of appeals said
that the management company cited no authority for the argument that an
agent whose poor management drove away a tenant should be liable only for
lost profits, and found the landlord's argument in this regard to be persua-
sive. 138 That portion of the decision, however, is dicta because the manage-
ment company failed to preserve error on the issue. 139
C. Mitigation
Since the confused welter of opinions in Brown v. RepublicBank First Na-
tional' 40 in 1988, Texas lawyers have wondered to what extent, if any, a
landlord has a duty to mitigate damages following a breach by its tenant. In
130. Id.
131. Id. at 677-78.
132. Id. at 679.
133. Id. at 682.
134. 797 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Tex. 1990).
135. 747 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1988).
136. 792 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
137. Id. at 131.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 766 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1988).
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Cassidy v. Northwest Tech Center Associates, Ltd. 141 the Dallas court of ap-
peals unequivocally affirmed its position that a landlord has no duty to miti-
gate under the common law, and held that nothing in Brown alters the
common law rule.142 Because writ has been granted in Cassidy, it appears
likely that the Texas Supreme Court will soon have to either adopt or dis-
own its duty to mitigate.143
Mitigation was also at issue in Vasquez v. Carmel Shopping Center Co.,144
but because the landlord's duty to mitigate was expressly agreed to in the
lease, the court made no reference to Brown in reaching its determination.
The tenant sought permission to assign its lease, but the landlord would not
consent unless the assignee agreed to a rent increase. The assignee refused,
and ultimately the tenant was unable to meet its obligations and defaulted.
The landlord took possession and re-let the premises at a lower rental, sued,
and obtained summary judgment for the difference in rental value. 145 The
tenant appealed, asserting a fact issue as to whether the landlord failed to
mitigate damages by refusing to accept the proposed assignment. The court
rejected this argument, noting that the lease obligated the landlord to make
reasonable efforts to re-let the premises at the best rental available, but only
after a breach of the lease by the tenant, a condition that had not yet oc-
curred at the time the tenant requested consent to the assignment. 146 The
court's conclusion, while certainly defensible, probably made the tenant wish
it had withheld rent in the month it requested consent to the lease
assignment.
D. Residential Tenancies
Two Survey cases in the residential area dealt with premises defects with
differing results. In Bryan v. Dockery, 47 which might be called the case of
the honest landlord, the deposition testimony of an elderly cripple stripped
her of her common law defenses regarding duty to repair nd resulted in a
judgment for injury to a visiting postman. 48 The case arose when a mail-
man delivering a package was injured by the collapse of a stairway leading to
a garage apartment. The apartment was leased under an oral tenancy, and
the parties admitted that there was no clear agreement concerning who was
responsible for repairs, though from time to time the tenant would notify the
landlord about various conditions and then would repair them at the land-
lord's cost. The landlord cited Yarbrough v. Booher' 49 for the proposition
that, absent a statute, agreement, or concealed condition, the tenant takes
141. 785 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ granted).
142. Id. at 412 (citing Metroplex Glass Center, Inc. v. Vantage Properties, Inc., 646
S.W.2d 263 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
143. Writ was granted, in part on the mitigation issue, at 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 622, 623 (June
30, 1990).
144. 777 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
145. Id. at 533.
146. Id. at 535-36.
147. 788 S.W.2d 447 (rex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1990, n.w.h.).
148. Id. at 452.
149. 141 Tex. 420, 422, 174 S.W.2d 47, 48 (1943).
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the risk of the premise's condition and the landlord is not liable for injuries
caused by an unsafe condition. The injured mailman argued that the Texas
Property Code supplants the holding of Yarbrough and imposes liability on
the landlord.1 50 Under the Texas Property Code, the landlord's duty to re-
pair arises only if the tenant is current in its rental payments. In this case,
however, no evidence was adduced at trial on that point. The mailman pre-
vailed all the same, however, because in deposition testimony the landlord
had stated unequivocally that she owned the apartment, that she had respon-
sibility for it, and would "take all the blame." The court of appeals relied on
these statements in upholding judgment for the mailman. 151
The loquacious landlord in Bryan should be compared with the taciturn
one in Montelongo v. Goodall,152 whose tenant under an oral lease broke her
ankle in a fall down stairs at the leased premises. The tenant sued the land-
lord alleging failure to exercise ordinary care. In upholding a summary
judgment in favor of the landlord, the court noted that when a landlord gives
up possession of property to a tenant, he owes no further duty to exercise
ordinary care unless he has knowledge of hidden defects or unless there is an
agreement to the contrary. 153 The evidence indicated that the landlord
agreed to be responsible for major repairs only when the tenant notified him
that such repairs were needed. The court could not determine if the condi-
tion of the stairs was such as to require a major repair, but did not need to
reach that issue as it was clear that the tenant never notified the landlord
about any problems with the stairs.' 54
An effort to engraft a common law duty to demand rent prior to initiating
a forcible entry and detainer action was unsuccessful in Caro v. Housing
Authority of the City of Austin.155 The tenant was evicted for non-payment
of rent and defended by alleging that the landlord had failed to demand
payment of rent before bringing a forcible entry and detainer action. While
the Austin court of appeals generally indicated that there is no common law
duty of demand, it disposed of the case on other grounds because the resi-
dence in question was part of a subsidized housing project and was subject to
specific grievance procedures imposed by the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development. The HUD pfocedures preempted any applicable
state common law demand requirements. 156
150. 788 S.W.2d at 449-50. The relevant statutory provision, TEx. PROP. CODE ANN.§ 92.052 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1990), requires a landlord to repair or remedy a condition if
the tenant notifies the landlord, the tenant is current in rent at the time, and the condition
materially affects health or safety of an ordinary tenant. The court also noted that Kamarath
v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658, 660-61 (Tex. 1978), established an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity in a dwelling unit rental. The court, however, did not rely on Kamarath in its holding.
Dockery, 788 S.W.2d at 450.
151. Dockery, 788 S.W.2d at 450.
152. 788 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, n.w.h.).
153. Id. at 718, 719 (citing Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Tex.
1978); Morton v. Burton-Lingo Co., 136 Tex. 263, 150 S.W.2d 239, 240 (1941); Prestwood v.
Taylor, 728 S.W.2d 455, 460 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
154. Goodall, 788 S.W.2d at 719-20.
155. 794 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).




In Rockport Shrimp Coop. v. Jackson 1 57 a concerned tenant holding under
a lease dating back to 1969 entered into a new lease with a navigation district
that it believed might be the true owner of the subject property. Rental
under the new lease was paid into a trust account, and would be returned if
the district turned out not to have superior title. Some time after execution
of the contingent lease, the old landlord brought suit to establish title and
ultimately obtained clear title to the subject property.158 The tenant then
brought suit against the landlord and the district seeking to affirm the dis-
trict lease (apparently because the rent under the district lease was preferable
to that under the old lease). The appeals court had little trouble affirming
judgment in favor of the landlord, relying on the long-standing rule that so
long as a tenant is not disturbed in its possession, it is estopped to deny its
landlord's title.1 59 The tenant claimed its situation fell within the exception
to the general rule that permits a tenant to acquire superior title in instances
where the landlord has no title. The tenant, however, had not acquired su-
perior title, but rather had only entered into a lease with a party who alleg-
edly had superior title. The facts, therefore, were insufficient to bring the
tenant within the exception.1 60
In Fabrique, Inc. v. Corman 16t the issue was whether a landlord must
place an assignee into peaceful possession where the lease permits assign-
ment. The assignee obtained its leasehold interest by assignment out of a
bankruptcy proceeding with court approval, but the landlord warned the
assignee not to take possession of the property. The assignee then brought
suit to enforce the lease and the landlord moved for summary judgment al-
leging that as a matter of law it owed no duty to put the assignee in posses-
sion, having put the original tenant in possession. The landlord also sought
recovery of unpaid rentals.1 62 The court held that when the terms of a lease
expressly or impliedly give the tenant the right to assign, then the landlord
impliedly covenants that it will not hinder the assignee's possession follow-
ing a valid assignment. 6 3 But bicause the trial court had not determined
whether the assignment was valid, the appeals court reversed for further pro-
ceedings.' 4 The appeals court also found that the assignee acted properly in
declining to take possession in the face of the warnings from the landlord not
to do so, and rejected the landlord's argument for unpaid rentals because he
157. 776 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
158. Id. at 760.
159. Id. (citing Lorino v. Crawford Packing Co., 142 Tex. 51, 175 S.W.2d 410, 417 (1943);
Parker v. Standard Oil Co. 250 S.W.2d 671, 680 ('ex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1952, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)).
160. Rockport Shrimp, 776 S.W.2d at 761.
161. 796 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, n.w.h.).
162. Id. at 791.
163. Id. at 793. The court noted the general rule that once a landlord has placed a tenant
in possession, if a stranger thereafter trespasses it is the tenant's responsibility to cure the
problem. Id. at 792 (citing Hertzberg v. Beisenbach, 64 Tex. 262, 265 (1885)).
164. Rockport Shrimp, 796 S.W.2d at 791, 793.
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was estopped by his own actions. 165
IV. LIs PENDENS
A case of first impression in Texas, Prappas v. Meyerland Community Im-
provement Association,166 will likely make the filing of a lis pendens notice a
common practice in litigation involving anything that even remotely in-
volves real estate. As Prappas makes clear, a litigant who records a notice of
lis pendens is completely shielded from the consequences of his act, even
where the filing is unauthorized and malicious. 167
Prappas arose when several homeowners sought to sell their properties
after a period of heavy flooding. Fearing that the proposed buyer would use
the properties for commercial development, a number of other homeowners,
in combination with a homeowners' association, sought a declaratory judg-
ment to block the sale. The complaining homeowners lost at trial. After the
trial court entered its judgment, and on the eve of the impending sale, the
complaining homeowners filed a notice of lis pendens which caused the sell-
ers' deal to unravel. The court of appeals subsequently affirmed the trial
court's judgment against the complaining homeowners, and the Texas
Supreme Court declined to review the case.168 The jilted sellers next
brought suit against the complaining homeowners for slander of title and
tortious interference with contract.
The sellers' chief contention was that the recording of the lis pendens
amounted to a tort. At the outset, however, this argument faced a major
hurdle: since 1975, Texas courts have characterized a lis pendens notice as a
part of a judicial proceeding, and therefore entitled to the same absolute
privilege as all other communications that are uttered or published during
judicial proceedings. 169 This notion that lis pendens is to be swaddled in a
cloak of privilege was most recently affirmed in another case from this Sur-
vey period, Sharif-Munir-Davidson Development Corp. v. Bell.170 The privi-
leged nature of a lis pendens filing would defeat the sellers' cause of action
because by definition, "[a]n absolutely privileged communication is one for
which, by reason of the occasion upon which it was made, no remedy
exists." 171
The selling homeowners in Prappas attempted to distinguish the prior de-
cisions as cases involving lis pendens notices that were authorized by stat-
165. 796 S.W.2d at 792.
166. 795 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
167. Id. at 795.
168. Id. For further factual background, see Meyerland Community Improvement Ass'n
v. Temple, 700 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.) 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
169. Prappas, 795 S.W.2d at 795 (citing Kropp v. Prather, 526 S.W.2d 283 (rex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Griffin v. Rowden, 702 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). More recently, the basis for the privilege has been expanded to in-
clude the open courts policy recognized by the Texas Supreme Court in Sakowitz, Inc. v.
Steck, 669 S.W.2d 105, 107 (rex. 1984).
170. 788 S.W.2d 427 (rex. App.-Dallas, 1990, writ denied).




ute; t72 that is, as instances where the underlying lawsuits actually involved
either title to real property, establishment of an interest in real property, or
enforcement of an encumbrance against real property. The selling home-
owners argued that, the recorded notice in the present case was unauthor-
ized. While authorized filings may be absolutely privileged, they said,
unauthorized filings are not.
The two judge majority writing for the Houston court of appeals readily
acknowledged that the filing at issue involved neither of the first two types of
lawsuits authorized by statute.1 73 Whether the lawsuit involved the enforce-
ment of an encumbrance, said the judges, was open to dispute. The parties
had briefed the question, but the majority did not decide it; rather, the ma-
jority assumed that the filing was unauthorized, and ruled that even an un-
authorized filing is granted the absolute privilege accorded other
publications during judicial proceedings. 174 The majority outlined several
reasons for its ruling. First, the court stated that there are several ways to
cause a lis pendens filing to be expunged.175 An aggrieved party can seek
cancellation of the filing under the statute itselff. 76 Indeed, where the filing
is unauthorized, courts have relieved the party seeking cancellation from the
rather onerous requirements of the statute.177 Also, the aggrieved party may
seek an order from the district court, with mandamus available if no relief is
forthcoming.178 Second, if there were a distinction between authorized and
unauthorized filings, courts frequently would become enmeshed in difficult
and derivative determinations of whether a particular filing was author-
ized.' 79 Finally, the majority imagined a parade of horribles that were sup-
posedly analogous to a litigant who becomes subject to tort liability when his
lis pendens filing is held to be unauthorized.180 The example mustered by
the court was a litigant who becomes subject to a defamation lawsuit simply
because he makes his claim in a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction. 181
Taken alone or together, the majority's reasons are not especially persua-
sive. The statutory procedure for cancelling a lis pendens is quite burden-
some to the petitioner, and the extra-statutory relief is, at best, uncertain. In
a case like Prappas, where the filing occurred on the eve of closing, it is
unlikely that any judicial relief would have been in time to save the day. As
for courts becoming enmeshed in determining whether filings are authorized
172. Tax. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.007(a) (Vernon 1984).
173. Prappas, 795 S.W.2d at 796.
174. Id. at 796.
175. Id.
176. Id. Section 12.008 of the Texas Property Code provides for the cancellation of a no.
tice of lis pendens if the petitioning party deposits money with the court or obtains a guaranty
of payment that is backed up by two sureties. In either case, the amount of security must
exceed the amount of the judgment sought. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.008 (Vernon 1984).
177. Prappas, 795 S.W.2d at 798 (citing Hughes v. Houston Northwest Med. Center, 647
S.W.2d 5, 7 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ dism'd)).
178. Prappas, 795 S.W.2d at 796 (citing Qibrich v. Touchy, 780 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ)).





under the lis pendens statute, such exercises in statutory interpretation are
precisely the business of courts. Besides, seeking the judicial relief pre-
scribed by the majority will in fact require courts to engage in the very same
exercises. As for the parade of horribles envisioned by the majority, it in-
spires more of a smirk than a shiver. There is no reason why a holding on lis
pendens cannot be limited to lis pendens. The real danger posed by Prappas
and similar cases is not an erosion of the open courts principle, but rather an
untrammelled abuse of the lis pendens process resulting in innocent parties
suffering significant and unrecoverable damages.
A dissent by Chief Justice Brown characterized the majority decision as
the creation of a privilege to commit a tort. 182 This, said the dissenter, was a
case in which tortfeasors waited until the last possible minute to record the
lis pendens, and did so with the explicit intention of thwarting the sale. 1 3
The dissenter pointed out that the law already allows such last minute mach-
inations by means of a temporary injunction, with the significant difference
being that the law of injunctions protects the party against whom the relief is
sought by requiring the posting of a bond. The effect of the majority deci-
sion is to give a litigant all of the benefits of the temporary injunction with
none of the burdens.' 8 4 The dissenter, noting that the recording of a lis
pendens was being accorded absolute privilege only because of its characteri-
zation as part of judicial proceedings, also doubted that the filing of a lis
pendens notice, taking place as it does at such a remove from the courtroom,
really amounts to a judicial proceeding in any meaningful sense of the
word. '8 5
V. TITLE AND CONVEYANCES
A. Generally
The question in Culbertson v. Brodsky'8 6 was whether a contract to ac-
quire land was an enforceable earnest money contract or a mere option con-
tract unsupported by consideration. The buyer under the contract had
deposited a $5,000 check with the title company, but the contract provided
for a sixty-day feasibility period during which the title company was not
authorized to cash the check and the buyer could terminate for any reason.
When the buyer sued for specific performance, the seller defended by claim-
ing that the contract was an option contract that was unsupported by con-
sideration. The buyer argued that the deposit of the check with the title
company was sufficient consideration to support the contract because such
deposit was a forbearance of the use of those funds. The court rejected this
argument because the check could not be cashed until after the feasibility
period expired; therefore, the buyer had free use of the amounts on deposit




186. 788 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied).
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in his account during that period.18 7 Consequently, the court said there was
no consideration for the option, and held for the seller.188
Krenek v. Texstar North America, Inc 189 was a textbook illustration of the
strip and gore doctrine. The owners of a 236-acre tract conveyed the surface
estate to twenty-four acres down the tract's center for use as a highway
right-of-way. Thereafter, the part of the tract on one side of the highway
was devised to the owners' son and the part on the other side was devised to
their daughter. The son conveyed his parcel under a deed that described the
property as running up to, but not including, the right-of-way. When oil
was later produced from the parcel, the son sued the oil company for drain-
age of the land under the right-of-way. The court set forth the fundamental
precepts of the strip and gore doctrine: Absent an express reservation to the
contrary, a conveyance of land bounded on an existing public road carries
with it the fee to the center of the road. 190 The presumption applies even if
the deed's metes and bounds description stops at the roadway's edge, and is
overcome only if the grantor owns land abutting both sides of the roadway
or if the roadway is larger and more valuable than the conveyed tract. In
this case, said the court, the strip and gore doctrine was clearly applicable,
and the son was entitled to no damages because he was presumed to have
conveyed his interest in the mineral estate beneath the roadway. 191
B. Reformation
A loosely drafted lease addendum was rescued by the doctrine of reforma-
tion in Olson v. Bayland Publishing, Inc. 192 The addendum granted the ten-
ant an option to purchase up to a 50% ownership interest in property
"better known as 2472 Bolsover Bldg."'193 The tenant exercised the option
and a dispute arose as to whether the 2472 Bolsover building also included
two additional lots which, though used by the tenant for parking, were
neither adjacent to the building nor located on Bolsover Street.
The court agreed that the property description did not satisfy the statute
of frauds as to the two lots, but considered whether the doctrine of reforma-
tion could all the same sustain a damage verdict for the tenant.194 The court
acknowledged that the property description in this case was more deficient
than in any of the previously decided cases which upheld reformation arising
out of mutual mistake.' 95 The court noted, however, that reformation is an
equitable remedy that seeks to place the parties in the position they intended,
187. Id. at 157. Presumably, if the contract had permitted the title company to cash the
check, then there would have been sufficient consideration to support the contract.
188. Id. at 158.
189. 787 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
190. Id. at 568 (citing, inter alia, State v. Williams, 335 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex. 1960)).
191. Krenek, 787 S.W.2d at 568-69.
192. 781 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
193. Id. at 661.
194. Id. at 662-63. The relevant statute of fraud provision is found at TEx. Bus. & CoM.
CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1987).
195. Olson, 781 S.W.2d at 662-63 (citing Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex.
1972)). In Morrow, the court remanded for a retrial on a theory of reformation based upon
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and held that the appropriateness of reformation should be based, at least in
part, on the strength of the evidence of mutual mistake. 196 In Olson the
evidence included the following facts: 1) the landlord told the tenant that the
addendum included the two lots, 2) the landlord offered the lots to the ten-
ant in two prior sales attempts, 3) the lots were pledged with the building to
secure a mortgage loan, 4) the lots provided essential parking to the build-
ing, and 5) the landlord earlier furnished the tenant with a written descrip-
tion of the building that included a legal description of the two lots. Taken
together, these facts were sufficient to support the jury's reformation
verdict. 197
In contesting the damage award, the landlord argued that the tenant was
not ready, willing, and able to consummate the transaction because the ten-
ant was not in a position to execute a joint venture or management agree-
ment covering its undivided interest in the property. 198 The appeals court
dismissed the argument, holding that the damages verdict was adequately
supported by the jury's finding that a joint venture agreement was also omit-
ted from the addendum by mutual mistake. 199 The holding is quite expan-
sive given the rather sketchy language of the addendum (which is set out in
the case), and surely constitutes the high-water mark for the doctrine of ref-
ormation. It seems doubtful, though, that the result would have been the
same had the tenant sought to enforce specific performance rather than to
collect damages.
C. Title Insurance Companies
Title insurance companies fared poorly in suits involving the escrow func-
tion during the Survey period, suffering reversals of three verdicts in their
favor. In Zimmerman v. First American Title Insurance Co.200 a broker who
had arranged for the sale of forty-eight lots was to receive one of them as his
commission; his right to the lot was set forth in the contract of sale, which
he signed and delivered to the title company. The closing instructions from
the purchaser's lender required that the deed of trust securing the loan cover
all of the lots. The transaction was closed by the title company, which also
recorded the deed conveying the lot to the broker. The purchaser subse-
quently defaulted, and the bank foreclosed its lien and sold all forty-eight
lots to another purchaser. The new purchaser obtained a new loan from a
different bank, again secured by a deed of trust encumbering all of the lots.
The broker learned of the situation only three years after the original closing
when he received no tax statement for his lot. He then contacted the title
company, which obtained a quitclaim deed from the purchaser at the fore-
closure sale. Inexplicably, the title company did not also obtain a release
strong evidence in the record that the parties intended to describe a particular tract and that
they were mutually mistaken in the belief that the description used was legally sufficient.
196. Olson, 781 S.W.2d at 663.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 664.
199. Id.
200. 790 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, writ denied).
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from the bank then holding a lien on the lot. The new purchaser also de-
faulted and the new bank foreclosed its lien, leading to a suit by the broker
against the title company for breach of contract, negligence, and violation of
the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.20 1
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the title company on the
theories that it owed no duty to the broker, that the broker had elected to
accept the lot encumbered by the liens, and that the cause of action was
barred by limitations. Thus the court of appeals reviewed the case under the
standards applicable to appeal from a directed verdict.20 2 The court of ap-
peals found the contention that no duty was owed insupportable because the
broker was a signatory to the contract and possessed enforceable legal rights
under it.203 The court also noted that the broker had previously done busi-
ness with the title company and had brought the contract to the title com-
pany not only to procure title insurance for the buyer, but also to handle the
closing in conformity with instructions. 204 The court held that a title com-
pany can be liable for negligence in closing a real estate transaction and that
when a title company acts as an escrow agent, it becomes a fiduciary.205
To support the ubiquitous DTPA claim, the broker testified that the title
company advised him that he need not obtain an owner's policy because title
to all the lots would be checked in connection with the sale to the original
purchaser (a rather curious position for a title company to take). The court
found this testimony sufficient to support a claim for a false or misleading
act.06
The court gave little credence to the title company's argument that the
broker's acquiescence amounted to an election to accept the lot encumbered
by liens and a waiver of any rights to recovery. The court said that the
broker asserted his rights as soon as he was aware of the situation, and that
instituting suit against all possible parties at that time was not an election of
remedies. 207 Finally, the court disposed of the limitations claim by noting
that the existence of a fiduciary relationship may excuse a party from mak-
ing a prompt and thorough investigation of records and may also estop a
person from asserting limitations as a defense if his conduct kept another
ignorant of the situation.20 The court was clearly influenced by the title
company's undertaking to cure the problem, albeit unsuccessfully, when the
broker first brought the matter to the title company's attention.
201. Id. at 694.
202. Id. A directed verdict requires that evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to
the appellant's position disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences. If there is evidence
about which reasonable minds could differ, the trial court's judgment must be reversed. See
Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 544 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex. 1976).
203. Zimmerman, 790 S.W.2d at 694.
204. Id. The court never mentioned that the closing instructions from the first lending
bank required that its deed of trust cover all the lots.
205. Id. at 695.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 697.




An egregious set of facts led to a rather obscurely written opinion in Boat-
right v. Texas American Title Co. 209 The Boatrights purchased a parcel of
property, giving back a first mortgage to their seller, and then immediately
sold the property to a new purchaser who gave back two mortgages to the
Boatrights, one in the same amount as the one the Boatrights had given and
another in the amount of $36,025. Both transactions were closed by the
same title company on the same day, but, amazingly, the deed from the Boa-
trights made no reference to the prior mortgage given by the Boatrights.
The deed of trust intended to secure the $36,025 note was never recorded,
and possibly was never signed. The Boatrights' purchaser made only a few
payments before defaulting, and the Boatrights referred the matter to an
attorney. The attorney's notice of default stated that the note was secured
by a recorded deed of trust, a statement that was untrue - the recording
reference mentioned in the letter was that of the deed from the Boatrights to
their purchaser. Ultimately, the attorney represented to the Boatrights that
he had foreclosed the lien securing the $36,025 note, and he delivered a sub-
stitute trustee's deed to them. In its analysis, the court stated that foreclo-
sure of a nonexistent or unrecorded deed was improper.210 If the deed of
trust was never executed, then this conclusion is correct, but the mere fact
that a deed of trust is not recorded does not render foreclosure improper,
although lien priority would certainly be an issue.211
The Boatrights' purchaser sued them, their attorney, and the title insur-
ance underwriter, alleging wrongful foreclosure. The underwriter settled
with the purchaser and took an assignment of the purchaser's claims alleging
that the Boatrights had breached their warranty of title when they executed
a warranty deed that made no mention of the prior existing mortgage (which
by then had been foreclosed as well). The Boatrights brought cross-actions
against the title company that closed the transaction, the title insurance un-
derwriter, and their attorney, and received a favorable jury verdict.212 The
trial court ignored the verdict, granting the underwriter's and the attorney's
motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.2 13 Consequently, the
procedural posture of the case limits its usefulness in other settings since if
there is the slightest evidence supporting the verdict, the judgment n.o.v.
must fail. 214
The court of appeals found that the title insurance company, as the escrow
agent for both transactions, owed a fiduciary duty to the Boatrights.215 The
court also held that due to the title company's additional role as agent of the
underwriter, the underwriter was in no position to raise a claim of breach of
warranty against the Boatrights. 216 In reaching this conclusion, however,
209. 790 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1990, writ dism'd).
210. Id. at 724.
211. Id.; see Denson v. First Bank & Trust of Cleveland, 728 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1987, no writ).
212. Boatright, 790 S.W.2d at 726.
213. Id. at 726, 729.
214. Id. at 726.
215. Id. at 727.
216. Boatright, 790 S.W.2d at 727-28.
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the court noted that the Boatrights had paid for an owner's title insurance
policy to protect them from title defects. While not entirely clear from the
opinion, this statement also probably is incorrect because of the likelihood
that the Boatrights paid for an owner's policy to protect their purchaser, as
is customary in Texas real estate transactions.21 7 The court also upheld thejury's verdict against the Boatright's attorney, noting that he had written
two letters and foreclosed on property without ever verifying that the note in
default was, in fact, secured by a recorded deed of trust.218 Unfortunately,
the opinion's language is rather murky, and the reader is never enlightened
on the seemingly important question of whether the purchaser from the Boa-
trights knew about the prior deed of trust.
The lesson of Lacy v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.219 is that a title company
should be loathe to be named as beneficiary under a letter of credit in an
escrow transaction. In Lacy, the landowner entered into a contract with
Sullivan Investments, Inc. to sell a tract of undeveloped land. The contract
granted Sullivan the right to terminate the contract at the end of the inspec-
tion period, November 30, 1984. Sullivan deposited $200,000 in the form of
a check with the title company as earnest money; thereafter, Sullivan substi-
tuted an irrevocable standby letter of credit for the check. The letter of
credit named the title company as the beneficiary for the benefit of the seller,
and was payable upon presentment with a signed statement from the seller
that Sullivan had defaulted under the contract.
Sullivan delivered the seller's broker a letter dated November 28, 1984,
terminating the contract. The broker, however, discovered the letter only on
December 5, 1984, and delivered it to the seller and the title company the
next day. Several weeks later, the seller informed the title company that
Sullivan had defaulted on the contract and instructed the title company to
draw on the letter of credit. Sullivan, in response, instructed the title com-
pany not to present the letter of credit. Faced with conflicting instructions,
the title company did nothing, the letter of credit expired, and the litigation
began.
The seller sued Sullivan for breach of contract and the title company for
breach of its fiduciary duty. Sullivan defended by claiming, first, that it had
timely delivered the termination notice to the seller and, second, that the
contract was formed under a mutual mistake regarding the extent to which
the property was affected by a flood plain. The jury found that the termina-
tion notice was not delivered timely because the seller's broker was not au-
thorized to receive the termination notice, but also found that the contract
was based on a mutual mistake, so the trial court entered judgment in favor
of Sullivan and the title company.220
The Dallas court of appeals reversed, holding that regardless of the par-
217. Id. at 727.
218. Id. at 729.
219. 794 S.W.2d 781 (rex. App.-Dallas 1990), aff'd in part & modified in part, 34 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 127, 127-28 (Nov. 28, 1990).
220. Id. at 784.
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ties' understanding about the flood plain when the contract was executed,
there was no evidence of a mistake that justified canceling the contract.221
The court's holding emphasized 1) that the contract permitted Sullivan to
terminate for matters reflected on the survey, 2) that the survey showed the
extent of the flood plain and Sullivan failed to terminate the contract after its
review of the survey, and 3) that Sullivan agreed to extend the contract for
an additional three weeks after receiving the survey.222 The appeals court
then addressed Sullivan's and the title company's liability.
Sullivan argued that it should not be liable for the earnest money because
its obligation was merely to deliver the letter of credit under the contract,
and the delivery of the letter of credit fully satisfied its obligation to pay the
earnest money.223 The court distinguished the Florida case which Sullivan
relied on as one in which the seller's only remedy was to retain the letter of
credit. In this case, by contrast, the contract allowed the seller to retain the
earnest money, as opposed only to the letter of credit.
The appeals court also found the title company liable for breaching its
fiduciary duty to the seller. 224 Because no escrow agreement defined the title
company's role, the court looked to the letter of credit to establish the rights
of the parties.225 As the beneficiary under the letter of credit, only the title
company was entitled to draw on the letter of credit. The court held that the
seller's complete dependence on the title company to make proper present-
ment created a fiduciary duty on the part of the title company to adhere
strictly to the terms of the letter of credit, despite any conflicting
instructions.226
VI. MECHANIC'S & MATERIALMAN'S LIENS
The Beaumont court of appeals, which in the recent past has undertaken
an adventuresome rewriting of the law of real estate foreclosure, 227 has now
decided to revise the mechanic's and materialman's lien statutes.228 The
court's muddleheaded opinion in Don Hill Construction Co. v. Dealers Elec-
trical Supply Co. 229 holds that an owner of property is liable for material
delivered to its property even if the supplier fails to give timely notice of its
claim to the original contractor.230
The case arose when a supplier was not paid for electrical materials that it
delivered to a subcontractor from August through November, 1985. The
221. Id. at 785.
222. Id. at 784-85.
223. Lacy, 794 S.W.2d at 792.
224. Lacy, 794 S.W.2d at 789.
225. Id. at 786.
226. Id. at 788.
227. See Halter v. Allied Merchants Bank, 751 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988,
no writ), in which the Beaumont court held that a guarantor may reduce the deficiency for
which it is liable by the difference between the fair market value of the property and the
amount bid by the lender at the property's foreclosure sale, and cases cited therein.
228. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.001-.240 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1990).
229. Don Hill, 790 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, n.w.h.).
230. Id. at 809.
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supplier delivered notices of non-payment to the original contractor and the
owner of the project on November 11, 1985.231 The form of the notice was
sufficient to authorize the owner to withhold funds from the original con-
tract price. The owner, however, neither withheld funds nor set aside the
required statutory retainage,232 prompting a suit by the supplier against the
subcontractor, original contractor, and owner, which resulted in a judgment
by the trial court against the three defendants for all four months of unpaid
bills.233
On appeal, the owner argued that it should not be liable for materials
delivered in August because the supplier had failed to deliver timely notice
to the original contractor of its claim for these materials.234 The appeals
court held, however, that the untimely notice to the original contractor did
not vitiate the claim against the owner because the notices to the original
contractor and the owner are separate from each other.235 The court said
that owner who receives the 90-day notice on a timely basis does not escape
responsibility because such notice was not timely under the 36-day notice
rule applicable to the original contractor.236
This decision conflicts with the plain language of the statute. An owner of
property is liable to a subcontractor performing work on or delivering
materials to its property in the following two instances: 1) if the owner fails
to retain undisbursed funds from the original contract price after it receives
a fund-trapping notice from the subcontractor;237 and 2) if the owner fails to
withhold from the original contract price the statutory retainage until 30
days after the work is completed.238 In either case, the notices required
under section 53.056(b) of the Texas Property Code must be sent.239 The
Property Code provides that "[i]f the owner has received the notices re-
quired by [sections 53.051-.059], if the lien has been secured, and if the claim
has been reduced to final judgment, the owner is liable for any money paid to
the original contractor after the owner was authorized to withhold funds
under [sections 53.051-.059].' 240 Before fund-trapping liability can be im-
231. Id. at 806. On November 19, 1985, the supplier delivered a second notice to the
owner and the original contractor increasing the amount of the debt to $10,638.60. The sup-
plier filed its lien affidavit on November 21, 1985. Id. at 806.
232. One alternative to avoid valid mechanic's and materialman's liens is an owner of prop-
erty who retains 10% of the original contract price until 30 days after the work is completed.
TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.101 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1991).
233. Don Hill, 790 S.W.2d at 806.
234. Under the applicable statute, the subcontractor was required to notify the original
contractor of its claim for non-payment by the 36th day following the tenth day of the month
after each month in which all or part of the claimant's material was delivered. TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 53.056(b) (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1991). The statutory time periods have since
been modified.
235. Don Hill, 790 S.W.2d at 809.
236. Id.
237. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.051, 53.084(b). (Vernon 1984).
238. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.105(a) (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1991).
239. The Property Code provides that "to perfect a lien, a person must comply with
[§§ 53.051-.059]." TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.051 (Vernon 1984). Further, "a claimant
other than an original contractor must give the notice prescribed by this section for the lien to
be valid." TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.056(a) (Vernon 1991) (emphasis added).
240. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.084(b) (Vernon 1984) (emphasis added).
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posed, there must be a valid lien which can be secured. Because the supplier
in Don Hill failed to deliver timely notice to the general contractor, the sup-
plier never obtained a valid lien. Without a valid lien, the supplier cannot
secure its lien as required by the statute. Further, the statutory-retainage
provisions of the mechanic's and materialman's statute require a subcontrac-
tor timely to deliver statutory notices to be entitled to a lien on retained
funds.241 The supplier did not timely deliver to the original contractor no-
tice of its claim for the materials delivered in August, thereby failing to com-
ply with the statutory-retainage provisions. A subcontractor must comply
with statutory-retainage provisions to receive a lien on an owner's property
for failure to retain funds.242 Therefore, the appeals court should have held
that the owner had fund-trapping and retainage liability only for the mate-
rial delivered after August.
MBank El Paso National Association v. Featherlite Corp. 243 involved a pri-
ority dispute between a subcontractor's lender, which had a security interest
in the subcontractor's accounts, and a subcontractor's brick supplier. The
brick supplier gave timely notice of its claim to the general contractor and
the owner, and timely filed its lien affidavit. Subsequently, the subcontractor
assigned to the supplier the funds owed to it by the general contractor, and
the general contractor signed a letter confirming that a joint check in the
names of subcontractor and the supplier would be drawn from the retainage
due under the original contract when received. Upon receipt of the letter,
the supplier filed a release of its lien. When retainage funds became avail-
able, the general contractor, aware of the conflicting claims of the lender and
the brick supplier, filed an interpleader action. The trial court found that the
supplier did not have a valid lien because it had filed an instrument releasing
its lien, and the lender also did not have a valid security interest because the
funds were not an account receivable of the subcontractor.244 The appeals
court reversed the trial court and held that the amount owed by the contrac-
tor to the subcontractor was at all times an account receivable, which be-
came subject to the supplier's lien when the supplier filed its lien affidavit.245
Once the supplier filed its release, however, the bank's security interest was
no longer subject to the supplier's claim; therefore, the bank was entitled to
the funds owed to the subcontractor by the general contractor. 246
VII. BROKERS
All of the brokerage cases from this Survey period featured the use of the
241. The Property Code provides that "[a] claimant has a lien on retained funds if the
claimant: (1) sends the notices required by this chapter in the time and manner required .... "
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.103 (Vernon 1984); see also, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.056
(Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1991) (outlining specific requirements for timely notice).
242. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.105 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1991).
243. 792 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ denied).
244. Id. at 474.
245. Id. at 475.
246. Id. at 476.
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Texas Real Estate License Act 247 as either a sword or a shield in disputes
over brokerage commissions. In Hitchcock Properties, Ina v. Levering248 the
appeals court denied a broker's claim for a commission in connection with
the sale of an option. The option was sold to a person procured by the bro-
ker, but the option holder sought to avoid payment of the commission by
claiming that there was no written agreement for a commission, therefore
precluding the broker's claim under the Real Estate License Act.249 The
broker argued that an option to buy real property is personal property and
thus not subject to the act. The Houston appeals court disagreed, and held
that an option to acquire real estate is an equitable interest in land and, as
such, is real estate for purposes of the act.2s0 Accordingly, the absence of a
written agreement was fatal to the broker's claim.
In David Gavin Co. v. Gibson251 David Gavin Company, which was not a
licensed real estate broker, entered into a consulting agreement with Gibson
under which Gavin agreed to help Gibson acquire an automobile dealership.
Gavin was also employed by the owners of a Toyota dealership to locate a
buyer for their dealership. Gavin introduced Gibson to the Toyota dealer-
ship's owners and helped negotiate an agreement for Gibson's acquisition of
the Toyota dealership; however, the transaction never closed. Gavin sued
Gibson, the Toyota dealership, and the dealership's owners for a commission
for the aborted sale. The trial court granted Gibson's motion for summary
judgment, ruling that Gavin had failed to prove it was licensed to perform
real estate brokerage as required by the Real Estate License Act.25 2 On ap-
peal, Gavin claimed that the act was not applicable because the disputed
transaction involved the sale of an ongoing business that merely included
realty. The appeals court noted, however, that under Texas law a fee for
handling a sale consisting in part of real estate is considered a real estate'
commission payment governed by the act.2 53 Whether an agreement con-
templates the sale of real estate is a question of fact.25 4 Unfortunately for
Gavin, his pleadings stated that he assisted in arranging a transaction which
contemplated that Gibson would purchase the assets of the dealership, in-
cluding improved real estate used by the dealership in its business. This
assertion of fact, which was not pled in the alternative, constituted a judicial
247. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
248. 776 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
249. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573(a), § 20(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991), provides that
no action may be brought "for the recovery of a commission for the sale or purchase of real
estate unless the promise or agreement on which the action is brought, or some memorandum
thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged.. .. "
250. Hitchcock, 776 S.W.2d at 238. The Real Estate License Act defines real estate as "a
leasehold, as well as any other interest or estate in land, whether corporeal, incorporeal, free-
hold, or non-freehold. ." TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573(a), § 2(1) (Vernon Supp.
1991).
251. 780 S.W.2d 833 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
252. Id. at 834. Gavin's case against Gibson was severed from Gavin's claims against the
dealership and its owners.
253. Id. (citing Hall v. Hard, 160 Tex. 565, 335 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Tex. 1960)).
254. David Gavin, 780 S.W.2d. at 834.
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admission. 255 Therefore, Gavin was not entitled to a commission because it
was not a licensed broker. What about the portion of the commission attrib-
utable to the non-real estate assets of the dealership? The court found the
contract was not severable and applied the rule that if consideration, or any
part thereof, is unlawful, the entire contract is void and unenforceable. 256
In Cissne v. Robertson 257 Cupp, a licensed broker, and Cissne, a licensed
salesman, sued a real estate partnership for a commission in connection with
the transfer of several partners' interests in the partnership. 258 The contract
of sale provided that the partnership would pay Cissne and another broker a
four percent commission if the sale closed. The partnership, however, al-
leged that there was no obligation to pay Cissne a commission because he
was a salesman rather than a licensed broker, and the Real Estate License
Act prohibits a salesman from receiving a commission from any person
other than a broker.259 Cupp and Cissne argued that all parties to the trans-
action knew Cupp was Cissne's sponsoring broker and that a commission
should be payable to Cupp for the efforts of Cissne. The court, however,
observed that Cupp was not a party to the agreement (the only parties to the
contract of sale were the buyer, the partnership, the other broker, and
Cissne);260 and because Cupp was neither a party to the contract nor men-
tioned as being Cissne's sponsor, the court held that Cupp was not entitled
to a commission. 261 Additionally, because Cissne was merely a real estate
salesman, the court held that no commission was payable to him.262
In Callaway v. Overholt263 the seller entered into a contract of sale with
two purchasers. The contract, which was not signed by the broker, provided
that the seller would pay the broker a $40,000 commission upon the con-
summation of a sale. The sale did not close and the purchasers and seller
entered into an agreement terminating the contract. Four months later, the
seller entered into another contract with one of the purchasers and another
party for the sale of the property. The subsequent contract did not refer to a
255. Id. at 835 (citing Houston First Am. Say. v. Musick, 650 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex.
1983)).
256. Id. (citing McFarland v. Haby, 589 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)).
257. 782 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
258. Cupp's and Cissne's claims were based on a contract to sell the partnership's real
property, however, the sale never closed. The partnership interests were subsequently trans-
ferred to the buyers under the contract of sale. Presumably, Cupp and Cissne claimed that the
sale of the partnership interests was tantamount to a sale of the property. Although the issue
was not presented, the court assumed, expressly stating it was not deciding the issue, that
brokering the sale of interests in a partnership that owns real estate would support a claim for
a commission under the Real Estate License Act. Id. at 914.
259. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573(a), § l(d) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (providing that
"[n]o real estate salesman shall accept compensation for real estate sales and transactions from
any person other than the broker under whom he is at the time licensed ....").
260. Cissne, 782 S.W.2d at 922. The contract of sale also contained a joinder of the brokers
pursuant to which each of the brokers represented that he knew "of no other brokers, salesper-
sons, or other parties entitled to any compensation for brokerage services arising out of this
transaction other than those whose names appear in this Agreement." Id.
261. Id. at 923.
262. Id.
263. 796 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, n.w.h.).
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broker's commission, and the purchase price was reduced by $140,000,
which equaled the sum of the broker's commission for the prior transaction
and the cost of repairs to the property. The second contract subsequently
closed, and the seller refused to pay the broker for either transaction. The
broker sued the seller for its commission and the trial court sustained the
broker's motion for a directed verdict.264
The seller argued that the phrase "upon the consummation of [the] sale"
imposed a condition on the broker's right to a commission, namely that the
sale must actually close.265 The Austin appeals court rejected the seller's
argument and held that the provision in the first sales contract merely stated
the time when the commission would be payable to the broker.26 6 The
Court did not abrogate the rule that a broker is entitled to a commission at
the time he procures a buyer who is ready, willing, and able to purchase the
seller's property on terms acceptable to the seller.267
VIII. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
Six Survey cases supply a practitioner's primer in restrictive covenants,
and illustrate both the utility and the limitations of covenants as governors
of land use in Texas. The first, City of Houston v. Muse,268 is certain to
strengthen the hand of municipalities that seek to enforce restrictive cove-
nants under chapter 203 of the Texas Property Code.269 The case arose
when the city attempted to enjoin an appliance repair business from operat-
ing in a subdivision that was subject to covenants allowing only residential
use. The trial court agreed that a breach of the covenants had occurred, but
ruled that the city was barred by laches from enforcing the covenants, and
also that enforcing the covenants would be inequitable. 270 Although it de-
clined to enjoin the business activities, the trial court did attempt something
like a Solomonic slicing of the baby by enjoining the business owners from
displaying sigs, allowing more than two vehicles near the premises, keeping
garbage in plain view, and loading goods onto vehicles with more than two
axles. 271
The court of appeals roundly trounced the trial court's laches analysis.
The elements of laches, it said, are 1) a good faith change of position by the
264. Id. at 830.
265. Id. at 831.
266. Callaway, 796 S.W.2d at 834. Although the agreement between the seller and the
broker was not in writing, the provision in the first contract of sale referring to the seller's
obligation to pay the broker satisfied the requirement of a writing under the Real Estate Li-
cense Act. Id. at 831 n.1. The court pointed out that the provision in the first contract was
merely a memorandum of the seller's and broker's agreement, and as such, did not preclude
the seller from submitting evidence that the commission was contingent upon consummation
of the sale. Id. at 832; see Parker v. Outhier, 209 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. 1948). The seller, however,
did not attempt to introduce any such evidence, and relied solely on the first contract's
provision.
267. 796 S.W.2d at 832.
268. 788 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. App.-Houston (ist Dist.] 1990, n.w.h.).
269. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 201.001-.013 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
270. Muse, 788 S.W.2d at 421, 424.
271. Id. at 421.
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party against whom a legal or equitable right is asserted, where the change is
made in reliance on the delay and is detrimental to such party, and 2) an
unreasonable delay in asserting the right.272 Examining the first element,
the court remarked that before purchasing the property, the business owners
had both actual and constructive notice of the covenants, which were re-
corded and mentioned in their deed and title policy, and about which they
were told by a neighbor. Thus, there was neither reliance nor a delay leading
to a change in position. 273
As to the second element of laches, the appeals court noted that the city
brought suit ten months after it received word of the violations. That inter-
val, said the court, as a matter of law is not unreasonable. 274 The appeals
court recognized that the trial court had held that the knowledge of the
subdivision residents must be imputed to the city, thereby extending the de-
lay period to more than four years.275 The appellate judges doubted that the
imputation was proper, but said that in all events the business owners, by
reason of their actual notice of the restrictions when they purchased the
property, failed to show a good faith detrimental change in their position in
reliance on the city's delay.276
In dicta, the appeals court questioned whether laches could ever be as-
serted against a city. The question turns on whether enforcing restrictive
covenants is a governmental or proprietary function, but the court con-
cluded that it need not reach the issue in light of its holding that the ele-
ments of laches did not exist.277
The appeals court made short shrift of the trial court's holding that the
harm of an injunction to the business owners would outweigh the resulting
benefit to the community. There must be a great disproportion between the
harm and benefit, said the appeals court, to justify such a holding.278 In this
case, there was precious little evidence either of harm to the business owners
or of lack of benefit to the community. 279 The appeals court concluded that
laches being no bar, and the equities not militating against injunctive relief,
the city must prevail, and therefore an award of attorneys' fees to the city
(which the trial court had denied) was mandatory under section 5.006(a) of
the Texas Property Code.280
The efficacy of restrictive covenants also received a boost in Lee v.
Braeburn Valley West Civic Association,281 which arose out of an attempt by
272. Id. at 422.
273. Id. (citing City of Fort Worth v. Johnson, 388 S.W.2d 400, 403 (rex. 1964)).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 422.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 424 (citing Garden Oaks Bd. of Trustees v. Gibbs, 489 S.W.2d 133, 134-35 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
279. Muse, 788 S.W.2d at 424.
280. Id. at 423-24 (citing TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.006(a) (Vernon 1984); Inwood N.
Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Meier, 625 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1981, no writ)).
281. 794 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1990, writ denied).
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a homeowners' association to collect past due assessments, together with in-
terest and late fees, from a delinquent homeowner. The homeowner chal-
lenged as usurious the 10% per annum interest charge and $5 late fee
provided for in the recorded restrictions. Moreover, because the assessments
were used to maintain an esplanade area not owned by him, and to provide
services that the City of Houston also provided, the homeowner claimed that
the assessments violated his constitutional right to equal protection.
In affirming a trial court decision, the appellate court pointed out that the
constitutional 6% per annum usury limit applies only in instances where
there is no agreed rate of interest.282 The court noted that the restrictions
were of record before the homeowner made his purchase, and that the home-
owner's deed recited that the conveyance was "made and accepted subject to
any and all restrictions. ' 28 3 The Eastland court of appeals held that this
language is tantamount to an agreement, and therefore removes the case
-from the constitutional limitation. 284 As for the late charge, the court held
that it was a penalty rather than compensation for the use or forbearance or
detention of money, and thus could not be properly characterized as interest
under the usury laws.2 5 The equal protection argument received similarly
short shrift; it was dismissed as unsupported by the record and undercut by
the homeowner's voluntary acceptance of property subject to the
restrictions. 286
Freedman v. Briarcroft Property Owners, Inc.2 7 illustrates the use of the
common law doctrine of nuisance to go where restrictive covenants cannot
in order to preclude a landowner from changing the use of property. In
Freedman a landowner's shopping center, which he had operated for thirty
years, was part of a platted subdivision that also encompassed house lots
standing behind the shopping strip and facing onto a quieter street. Upon
expiration of the covenants restricting the house lots to residential use, the
shopping center owner acquired one of the lots, tore down the existing dwell-
ing, and announced an intention to build a parking lot for shopping center
patrons. Two days after the demolition began, homeowners in the subdivi-
sion filed new deed restrictions which restricted the lots to residential use;
the homeowners' association subsequently filed suit to enjoin the shopping
center owner from using the lot for parking. The trial court disallowed en-
forcement of the homeowner's amended deed restrictions.288 The jury, in a
282. Id. at 45.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 45-46. The court cited no authority, but such authority exists. See Scoville v.
Springpark Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc., 784 S.W.2d at 498, 502 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990,
n.w.h.); Loving v. Clem, 30 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1930, writ ref'd); Meyerland
Community Improvement Ass'n v. Temple, 700 S.W.2d 263 (rex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
285. Lee, 794 S.W.2d at 46.
286. Id.
287. 776 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
288. Id. at 215. Another example from the Survey period of an unsuccessful attempt to
impose restrictions retroactively is Property Owners of Leisure Land, Inc. v. Woolf & Magee,
Inc., 786 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, n.w.h.) (restrictive covenants imposed after the
severance of the mineral estate could not be used to block the mineral owner's construction of
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split verdict, found that although use of the lot for parking did not violate
the original deed restrictions, the use did constitute a nuisance.289 Based on
that verdict, the trial court entered a permanent injunction against use of the
lot for parking.290
On appeal, the shopping center owner made numerous contentions, most
of which were quickly dispatched. First, he claimed that the homeowners'
association had no standing to bring suit because it owned no land. The
Houston appeals court responded that the covenants and governing docu-
ments of the association expressly charging it with a duty to enforce the
covenants gave the association more than mere naked possession of land,
and hence gave it standing to sue.29' The appellant next contended that the
nuisance issue was not ripe for trial because no parking lot yet existed. The
appeals court stated that although a court may generally grant injunctive
relief only to restrain an existing nuisance, 292 an exception exists for an im-
minent nuisance. 293 The court of appeals held that the declared intention to
create a parking lot was "ripe enough" for injunctive suit.294
Addressing the merits of the nuisance claim, the shopping center owner
pointed out that the homeowners' association was required to demonstrate a
reasonable certainty that the parking lot would be a nuisance,295 and argued
that the association had not adduced sufficient evidence to support the jury's
finding of nuisance. The appeals court, however, found ample record testi-
mony about the dangers to the residential neighborhood from increased
traffic.296
Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Youngtown, Inc. 297 arose when a lot owner
hired a contractor to construct a home that violated the subdivision's cove-
nants governing construction materials and minimum area. Upon suit by
the subdivision's developer, a jury returned a verdict against both the con-
tractor and the lot owner.298 The appeals court reversed the judgment
against the contractor, holding that the contractor had no ownership interest
in the lot and therefore no legal duty to comply with the covenants. 299
Moreover, said the court, the covenants by their terms were binding only on
purchasers of the lots and their heirs, successors, and assigns, which neces-
an emergency evacuation road where such construction was reasonably necessary to the explo-
ration, development, and production of minerals).
289. 776 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 215-16 (citing 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 82 (1950)).
292. Id.
293. Id. (citing O'Daniel v. Libal, 196 S.W.2d 211, 213 (rex. Civ. App.-Waco 1946, no
writ); 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 113 (1950)).
294. Id.
295. Freedman, 776 S.W.2d at 216-17 (citing Waggoner v. Floral Heights Baptist Church,
116 Tex. 187, 193, 288 S.W. 129, 131 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, opinion adopted); McAshan
v. River Oaks Country Club, 646 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1982, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); O'Daniel v. Libal, 196 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1946, no writ)).
296. Freedman, 776 S.W.2d at 217.
297. 786 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, n.w.h.).




sarily excluded third parties such as the contractor. 30° The developer urged
the court to impose liability on the contractor all the same for tortious inter-
ference, 301 but the court declined to do so, noting that tortious interference
had not been pled. 30 2
Scoville v. Springpark Homeowner's Association, Inc. 30 3 involved an at-
tempt by homeowners in the original portions of a subdivision to prevent the
secession by homeowners in a later addition to that subdivision. The entire
subdivision was governed by a Master Declaration that set forth certain re-
strictions for the original tracts and provided for the annexation of future
tracts by the filing of supplementary declarations which could contain provi-
sions that both complemented and modified those set forth in the Master
Declaration. The supplementary declaration at issue in Scoville contained,
in its article II, certain restrictions governing setbacks, building materials,
and the like, as well as provisions for assessments. Then, in its article III,
the supplementary declaration allowed the owners of 90% of the covered
lots to vacate or modify the restrictions. It was those article III provisions
that the homeowners in the addition relied upon in seceding.
The homeowners in the original subdivision fought the secession by point-
ing to a provision in the Master Declaration allowing vacation or amend-
ment only by consent of 75% of all homeowners, including those in the
original tracts and in the subsequently annexed tracts.
The appeals court, noting that rules of contract construction are applica-
ble to restrictive covenants,304 held that the language in the supplementary
declaration enabling the addition's homeowners to vacate the supplementary
restrictions meant exactly what it appeared to mean.30 5 The court found
that the supplementary declaration's vacation language was not inconsistent
with the Master Declaration's 75% amendment or abandonment provision
because the homeowners in the addition did not purport to amend or aban-
don the Master Declaration provisions which apply to the original subdivi-
sion homeowners. 30 6 In support of its holding, the majority cited Loving v.
Clem 30 7 and Meyerland Community Improvement Association v. Temple,308
which dealt with independent actions by homeowners in subsequently an-
nexed additions. A rather windy dissent, which cited most of the cases re-
lied on by the majority, argued that allowing an addition to secede of its own
initiative was inconsistent with the overall scheme of covenants, and was
therefore insupportable. 30 9
300. Id. at 12.
301. Id. In support, the developer cited Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768
(rex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 (1988).
302. Jim Walter Homes, 786 S.W.2d at 12.
303. 784 S.W.2d 498 (rex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
304. Id. at 502 (citing Parker v. Delcoure, 455 S.W.2d 339, 343 (rex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
305. Scoville, 784 S.W.2d at 503-04.
306. Id. at 504.
307. 30 S.W.2d 590 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1930, writ ref'd)).
308. 700 S.W.2d 263 (rex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
309. Scoville, 784 S.W.2d at 506-10 (Ovard, J., dissenting).
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A final case, Evans v. Pollock,310 contains a thorough exploration of the
doctrine of implied reciprocal negative easements, a branch line running off
the restrictive covenants trunk. Evans involved a peninsular tract extending
into Lake Travis that was originally owned by two married couples. The
couples subdivided their tract into seven blocks; one was landlocked on a
hill, and the other six had lake frontage. Before the couples made the subdi-
vision, however, they conveyed two lakefront lots to a third party. After the
subdivision, they apportioned the blocks among themselves, with one couple
taking three blocks and the other four, and with no agreement concerning
land use restrictions. Each of the couples then sold numerous lakefront lots,
all pursuant to deeds that prohibited business uses and contained other re-
strictions. The deeds were silent as to whether similar restrictions governed
other parts of the subdivision or whether similar covenants would be in-
cluded in other deeds of subdivision property. One of the two married
couples retained use of four lakefront lots and the entire landlocked block.
The controversy arose when that couple's devisees conveyed two of the
lakefront lots and the landlocked block to a third party, who proposed to
build a marina, club, and condominium development. A number of other
lakefront lot owners challenged the development plans, urging that all of the
property was subject to the residential-only restriction by reason of the doc-
trine of implied reciprocal negative easements. The trial court attempted a
compromise, holding that all lakefront lots were subject to the restriction but
that the landlocked parcel was not.311
In reversing the trial court, the appeals court recounted some root and
branch principles of restrictive covenants. Within the bounds of law and
public policy, it noted, parties are free to restrict property by covenants in
conveyance deeds. 312 Such covenants are generally considered personal to
the parties concerned, relate only to the conveyed property, and may be en-
forced only by the grantor and grantee.313 Exceptions to these general limi-
tations are instances where restrictions are imposed on separate grantees
pursuant to a general plan of development; there, one grantee may enforce
the restrictions against another on the theory of mutual covenant and con-
sideration. 314 In such instances, a grantee sometimes may compel his gran-
tor to adhere to the original development scheme by imposing like
restrictions on property thereafter conveyed by the grantor; such an imposi-
tion is referred to as a reciprocal negative easement. 31 5 The imposition of
310. 793 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ granted).
311. Id. at 18.
312. Id. at 19 (citing Curlee v. Walker, 112 Tex. 40, 43, 244 S.W. 497, 498 (1922)).
313. Id. at 19 (citing Green v. Gerner, 289 S.W. 99 (Tex. 1927)).
314. Id. (citing Painter v. MacDonald, 427 S.W.2d 127, 134 (rex. Civ. App. 1968), rev'd on
other grounds, 441 S.W.2d 179 (rex. 1969)).
315. Evans, 793 S.W.2d at 19. The doctrine of reciprocal negative easements has been
described as follows:
[W]here a common grantor develops a tract of land for sale in lots and pursues a
course of conduct which indicates that he intends to inaugurate a general
scheme or plan of development for the benefit of himself and the purchasers of
the various lots, and by numerous conveyances inserts in the deeds substantially
uniform restrictions, conditions and covenants against the use of the property,
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such easements is never retroactive; rather, the development plan must origi-
nate with the common owner while the property is in his hands. Moreover,
the plan must apply to the entire tract on which the restrictions are sought
to be enforced. 316
The indispensable requirement of a common owner was lacking in this
case, said the court, because the married couples had apportioned the land
before making the conveyances. 317 Also absent was the requirement that the
entire tract be covered by the restrictions; two lakefront lots had been con-
veyed to third parties without any restrictions before the land was subdi-
vided into blocks, and the lakefront lot owners conceded that the residential
use limitation was intended to apply only to the lakefront lots, and not to the
landlocked block. In light of the rule that extreme caution is to be used in
imposing reciprocal negative easements,318 and the rule that evidence of the
general development plan applicable to the entire tract must be clear and
unmistakable, 319 the appeals court found that no such easements could prop-
erly be imposed in this case. The appellate judges said that the trial court's
attempt to fashion an equitable solution was understandable, but also held it
to be improper.320 Implied reciprocal negative easements do not exist at all
absent an origin from a common owner's plan that applies to the entire tract;
those circumstances are the only justification for impressing retained land
with use restrictions, and, absent those circumstances, no such impress is
allowable.321
IX. EMINENT DOMAIN
A4. Inverse Condemnation Caused by Flooding
Three Survey cases involving actions for damages from flooding reveal
courts struggling to construe some rather muddled precedent. Although the
issues in the cases are somewhat similar, the temperaments displayed by the
different appeals courts are quite different.
In the City of Odessa v. Bell 322 the El Paso court of appeals considered a
jury award of punitive and actual damages for flooding caused by sewer ef-
the grantees acquire by implication an equitable right, variously referred to as an
implied reciprocal negative easement or an equitable servitude, to enforce simi-
lar restrictions against that part of the tract retained by the grantor or subse-
quently sold without the restrictions to a purchaser with actual or constructive
notice of the restrictions and covenants.
Minner v. City of Lynchburg, 204 Va. 180, 129 S.E.2d 673, 679 (1963) (citations omitted).
Texas has long recognized the concept of the doctrine of implied reciprocal easements. See
Saccomanno v. Farb, 492 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing
various cases).
316. Evans, 793 S.W.2d at 19.
317. Id. at 25.
318. Id. at 20 (citing Saccomanno v. Farb, 492 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)).
319. Id. (citing Saccomanno v. Farb, 492 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)).
320. Evans, 793 S.W.2d at 26.
321. Id. at 25-26.
322. 787 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1990, n.w.h.).
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fluent overflow during heavy rain. The court, in a carefully reasoned opin-
ion, took note of the now codified rule that the maintenance of a sanitary
sewer system by a city is a governmental function, not a proprietary one.323
The court also noted that a city was not liable even for its negligence in
performing governmental functions until the passage of the Texas Tort
Claims Act in 1969.324 In response to the aggrieved landowners' contention
that their case arose not under the Tort Claims Act, but rather under article
I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution, and was therefore different, the court
pointed to the express language of the constitutional provision, which pro-
vides only for "adequate compensation" in the event of a taking. 325 By defi-
nition, said the court, that formulation excludes exemplary damages, and
makes adequate actual damages the exclusive remedy. 326 The court dis-
agreed with the landowners' view that the Texas Supreme Court opinion in
City of Gladewater v. Pike327 allowed the recovery of exemplary damages
from a municipality for claims not brought under the Tort Claims Act.328
The court explained that Pike stands for the much narrower proposition that
in the case of the negligent performance of a proprietary function, which at
the time of the Pike decision was not covered by the Tort Claims Act, exem-
plary damages could be recovered in egregious circumstances. 329 The court
acknowledged that two cases cited by the landowner held out the possibility
of exemplary damages in exceptional cases of malicious conduct or evil in-
tent.330 The court said such circumstances were not present in this case, and
it doubted such circumstances would be present in any case.33' The court
further suggested that the cited cases were of dubious authority because an
award of exemplary damages under article I section 17 would be justified
only if the-constitution were amended to allow recovery of such damages.332
The city also argued that, notwithstanding the jury's findings that the
flooding damage was temporary, the facts and law established that the dam-
age was permanent, and therefore the statute of limitations barred any re-
covery because the landowners had notice of the flooding more than two
years before they filed suit. The case law defines permanent damage as "con-
stant and continuous" damage, noted the court, and defines temporary dam-
age as occasional, intermittent, recurrent, sporadic, and "contingent upon
323. Id. at 527 (citing Callaway v. City of Odessa, 602 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso 1980, no writ); codified as TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.0215(a)
(Vernon Supp. 1991)).
324. Bell, 787 S.W.2d at 527.
325. Id. at 528.
326. Id. (citing Holt v. City of San Marcos, 288 S.W.2d 802, 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
327. 727 S.W.2d 514 (rex. 1987).
328. Bell, 787 S.W.2d at 528.
329. Id.
330. Id. (citing San Antonio River Auth. v. Garrett Bros., 528 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Ostrom v. City of San Antonio, 77 S.W. 829 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1903, writ ref'd)).
331. Bell, 787 S.W.2d at 528.
332. Id. at 529.
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some irregular force such as rain. '333 The city argued that the injury in this
case could not be enjoined, and was therefore permanent in nature. The
court agreed that Neely v. Community Properties, Inc.,334 decided by the
Texas Supreme Court, suggests that if the activity causing the injury cannot
be successfully enjoined, then the damage is permanent. 335 The court rea-
soned that the suggestion in Neely that the inability to enjoin an activity is a
characteristic only of a permanent injury was the mistaken progeny of a
misreading of an earlier case.336 The better rule is that, while the ability to
enjoin is an indicium of a temporary injury, the unavailability of injunction
does not necessarily change a temporary injury into a permanent one. The
court concluded that there was ample evidence that the flooding was spo-
radic and contingent, and therefore temporary.337
In contrast to the measured approach of Bell is the rather untidy opinion
in City of Princeton v. Abbott,338 which arose out of a suit against the city by
the owner of a roller skating rink. The landowner's skating rink periodically
flooded because of the overflow of water which collected behind an embank-
ment on the city's land during rain storms. All agreed that the flooding
began only after another landowner, whose tract adjoined the city's, levelled
the agricultural terraces on the land. Appealing from a jury verdict award-
ing damages to the owner of the roller skating rink,3 3 9 the city contended
that 1) the city had not diverted or impounded the natural flow of surface
waters in such a manner as to damage the claimant's property, and 2) even if
the city had done so, such a diversion or impoundment does not constitute
an actionable nuisance.
In support of its first contention, the city argued that the water collecting
at its embankment had not arrived there in a natural state because of the
adjoining landowner's levelling of the terraces. The court answered by not-
ing that the agricultural terraces were themselves man-made, and that the
levelling returned the adjoining land to its natural state. Therefore, the
water collected at the city's embankment as a result of a natural flow.34°
The court's response, like a landscape painted on a wall, is pleasing to glance
at but not altogether satisfactory for any sustained exploration. The levees
along the Mississippi River are man-made, but it hardly follows that, were
someone to remove them, each person whose land is crossed by the resulting
flood should be exposed to liability for water that flows onto his neighbor's
land.
Regarding the city's contention that the impoundment did not constitute a
nuisance, the city argued that the claimant had proven neither of the requi-
333. Id. at 530 (quoting Bayouth v. Lion Oil Co., 671 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Tex. 1984) (citing
Kraft v. Langford, 565 S.W.2d 223, 227 (rex. 1978))).
334. 639 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1982).
335. Id. at 454.
336. Bell, 787 S.W.2d at 530.
337. Id.
338. 792 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
339. Id. at 162.
340. Abbott, 792 S.W.2d at 164.
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site elements of intention and unreasonableness. 341 The court, in an analysis
that will not bear too much scrutiny, said that the intentional nature of the
city's actions was proven by the fact that it had notice of a problem and still
allowed it to continue. The unreasonableness of the city's actions was, con-
tinued the court, established by the fact that the city attempted to correct the
problem but only ended up exacerbating it.
Finally, the city attacked the jury's $30,000 award for future water dam-
age. The appeals court agreed that the injury to the claimant's property was
of a temporary nature, which meant that the measure of recovery was "the
cost of restoring the property to its condition immediately before the injury,
plus the reasonable value of the loss of its use."'342 Accordingly, said the
city, the jury award was improper because it amounted to a recovery for
future damages. The court declined to "ensnare" itself "in the finer distinc-
tions between permanent and temporary injuries and the particular type of
damages recoverable under each."'343 It conceded that one of the cases relied
on by the city3 " was instructive on the distinction between damages recover-
able for permanent versus temporary injuries, but said, in a rather astonish-
ing passage, that the cited case "concerns the diversion of the natural flow of
stream water rather than the impoundment of surface water, and is factually
distinguishable to that extent. '345 The phenomenon of a court declining to
"ensnare" itself in legal distinctions which, though subtle, have for at least a
century been regarded as significant, while at the same time disposing of
hoary precedent by making factual distinctions of ethereal wispiness, is at
least curious.
In Allen v. City of Texas City346 the landowners asserted that a levy con-
structed by the city reduced the value of their property (located between the
levy and Galveston Bay), and made the property more susceptible to flood-
ing, thereby constituting a taking which entitled the landowners to compen-
sation. The court of appeals, however, reiterated the long-standing Texas
rule that the doctrine of inverse condemnation requires a taking, damage, or
destruction amounting to an actual physical appropriation or invasion of
property or an unreasonable interference with its use.347 The landowners'
pleadings on their face did not allege any invasion of property nor any inter-
ference with use to support their inverse condemnation claim.348 The court
also rejected the landowners' claims that failure to recognize their rights
now would make them susceptible to a limitations defense if their property
341. Id. at 166 (citing RrSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 833 comment b (1979)).
342. Id. at 164 (citing Kraft v. Langford 565 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex. 1978); Lone Star Gas
Co. v. Hutton, 58 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, holding approved); Willacy
County Water Control & Imp. Dist. v. Cantrell, 169 S.W.2d 203, 204 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio), writ dism'd 141 Tex. 335, 172 S.W.2d 294, 295 (1943)).
343. Abbott, 792 S.W.2d at 164.
344. Id. at 165 (citing Lone Star Gas Co. v. Hutton, 58 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1933, holding approved)).
345. Abbott, 792 S.W.2d at 165.
346. 775 S.W.2d 863 (rex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
347. Id. at 864-65 (citations omitted).
348. Id. at 865, 866.
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sustained actual flood damage in the future.349 The court noted that a cause
of action for damage to land does not lie for future anticipated damages, and
that the applicable two-year statute of limitations would commence to run
only when the damage occurs. 350
B. Other Inverse Condemnation
An additional Survey case, Estate of Scott v. Victoria County, 351 arose
when developers who were exasperated by a moratorium on issuance of sew-
age treatment permits instituted a claim for inverse condemnation damages.
The developers had restricted the property to residential use and subdivided
it into single-family lots, but were stalled in their sales efforts because the
county refused to issue further permits for sewage treatment in an admit-
tedly overextended treatment plant. After reviewing the facts, the court
found that the county's denial of sewage treatment was a reasonable exercise
of its police powers, that there was no agreement requiring the county to
provide sewage treatment capacity, and that the developers had brought
some of their problems upon themselves by restricting the use of the prop-
erty to residential purposes.352 The court also held that in the absence of a
binding agreement, a mere expectancy of sewer service is not a vested prop-
erty right, and a temporary loss of use does not constitute an interference
amounting to a taking for which compensation is required.353
X. ADVERSE POSSESSION
Rhodes v. Cahill,35 4 a decision by the Texas Supreme Court, is another
instance of judicial modesty from a court that until only two years ago was
almost shameless in its pretensions of omnicompetence. Rhodes involved an
adverse possession claim by the owner of a 177-acre tract which, at the time
of its purchase, was enclosed by a fence that also enclosed an adjoining fif-
teen-acre tract known as the cedar tract. For thirty-seven years the owner of
the larger tract grazed cattle on the smaller parcel, cleared cedar trees and
brush from it, and paid taxes on it. When the owner learned of plans to
construct a church on the cedar tract, she brought suit to establish title to
that tract under the 10-year statute. The trial court awarded her title to only
a small portion of the cedar tract, but the court of appeals reversed and
awarded her title to the entire tract.355
The Texas Supreme Court, speaking through its chief justice, reversed. 35 6
It noted that under venerable Texas authority,35 7 one seeking to disentitle
another of property through adverse possession bears the burden of proving
349. Id. at 866.
350. Id.
351. 778 S.W.2d 585 (rex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
352. Id. at 590-91.
353. Id. at 592.
354. 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 33 (Oct. 10, 1990).
355. Id.
356. Id. at 35.
357. Id. at 34 (citing Satterwhite v. Rosser, 61 Tex. 166 (1884)).
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not only that he has been in actual possession of the property for the requi-
site period, but also that his possession has been so visible, notorious, dis-
tinct, and hostile as to "indicate unmistakably" a claim of exclusive
ownership. 358 This requirement is reflected in the ten-year statute's require-
ment that the claimant's possession must constitute an actual and visible
appropriation of the land.359 The high court held that an isolated sale of
cedar, the selective clearing to permit grazing, and the payment of taxes
were, whether considered alone or together, insufficient to establish adverse
possession.
The court also considered evidence that the claimant had continuously
grazed cattle and goats on the cedar tract. Such evidence, it said, does not
establish title by adverse possession unless the disputed tract is "designedly
enclosed" for such grazing.36° The court distinguished between designed en-
closures and "casual fences." If the fence existed before the claimant's pos-
session, and if the claimant fails to demonstrate its purpose, then the fence is
a "casual fence," and the grazing of livestock within it does not constitute
adverse possession. The court took note of the claimant's occasional fence
repairs, and agreed that, as a hypothetical matter, one cannot rule out the
possibility that activities by the claimant may transform a casual fence into a
designed enclosure. 361 However, the court said it knew of no case in which
such a modification was found to have occurred, and said the mere repairing
or maintaining of a casual fence, albeit for the purpose of keeping the claim-
ant's animals within the fence's bounds, is not sufficient to perform the
alchemy. 362
Woodrow v. Henderson,363 arising out of a trespass to try title case, pro-
vided a road map to a rather out-of-the-way rule and its even more remote
exception. In Woodrow, the claimant contended that he was the owner of a
seventy-one acre parcel of land by reason of the ten and twenty-five year
statutes of limitation. The record title holders resisted these claims by point-
ing out that the claimant was in possession of a house on the land at the time
of a 1947 judicial foreclosure which conveyed all of the claimant's interest.
The record title holders obtained summary judgment based on the precept
that someone holding over after the execution of a deed is regarded as a
tenant at sufferance, and that before the limitation will run against the true
owner, the tenant at sufferance must repudiate his tenancy and notify the
true owner of the repudiation. 36 The court of appeals reversed the sum-
mary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.365 Among other rea-
sons for its reversal, the court said that a further corollary to the precept was
358. Rhodes, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 34 (Oct. 10, 1990).
359. Id. at 34 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.021 (Vernon 1986),
§ 16.026 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991)).
360. Id. at 34-35 (citing McDonnold v. Weinacht, 465 S.W.2d 136, 142 (Tex. 1971); Or-
sborn v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 153 Tex. 281, 287, 267 S.W.2d 781, 785 (1954)).
361. Id. at 35.
362. Id. at 35 (citing McDonnold v. Weinacht, 465 S.W.2d 136, 142-43 (Tex. 1971)).
363. 783 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, n.w.h.).
364. Id. at 285.
365. Id. at 286.
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that the tenant at sufferance need not give actual notice; rather, the
factfinder can infer constructive notice,366 and in this case there were dis-
puted issues of fact about whether the true owners had such constructive
notice.367
XI. EASEMENTS AND ROADS
Texas landowners seemed intent on denying access to their neighbors by
blocking roads during the Survey period, generally without success. In
Home v. Ross 368 Home saw fit to block a roadway which provided access to
two lots owned by the Rosses. The court had little difficulty in finding.
against Home, noting that the roadway was reflected on a recorded plat and
that the lots were conveyed by reference to that plat.369 Home objected that
the absence of language of dedication in the plat meant that the road was not
dedicated. The court responded that the roadway was an appurtenant ease-
ment, a type of easement that may be created without a written dedica-
tion.370 Although other courts have relied upon estoppel or implication to
uphold road easements created by platting, the court indicated it did not
matter whether the rationale was stated in terms of estoppel or implication
because easements of this type have been recognized by Texas case law for
more than a century.371
The landowner seeking to block access was given even shorter shrift in
Rushin v. Humphrey.372 The blocking landowner erected a gate across a 30-
foot strip of land which had been conveyed to him by the same party who
conveyed title to the landowner seeking access. The original grant of the
thirty foot strip provided that it was to be used as a roadway and that if such
use ceased, then the property would revert to the original grantor. Although
the blocking landowner argued that an easement of necessity could not be
shown from the evidence, the court found that the express language of the
conveyance itself implied the necessity of access, and held for the landowner
enforcing the roadway easement. 373
The landowner was also granted relief as to access, but denied damages, in
Hall v. Robbins.374 Hall, the owner of eighty-eight acres, had already ob-
tained a permanent injunction blocking the Robbins from further denying
access to the eighty-eight acre parcel, and sought damages for denial of ac-
cess from 1982 through 1987. Hall's evidence, however, related only to real
estate taxes and interest on a purchase money mortgage and on loans ob-
tained to pay taxes during the period of denied access. After discussing the
variety of remedies potentially available for a temporary injury to real prop-
366. Id. at 285.
367. Woodrow, 783 S.W.2d at 285.
368. 777 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, n.w.h.).
369. Id. at 756.
370. Id. at 757 (citing Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196, 203 (Tex. 1962)).
371. Home, 777 S.W.2d at 757 (citing Wolf v. Brass, 72 Tex. 133, 12 S.W. 159, 160 (1888)).
372. 778 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
373. Id. at 97.
374. 790 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, n.w.h.).
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erty, the appeals court upheld the trial judge's verdict denying damages be-
cause no evidence was presented on the proper measure of damages which,
in this case, would be for the loss of use of vacant land during the time access
was denied. 375
Motel Enterprises, Inc. v. Nobani 376 provides a warning to foreclosing
lienholders that they must take quick action to avoid ratification of ease-
ments granted after their liens. In 1983, the owner of a motel executed a
deed of trust covering the project. The project was subsequently divided into
two parcels with a cross-easement agreement allowing access between the
parcels for operation of the motel and an adjoining drive-in restaurant. The
cross easement was granted some two years after the original deed of trust
was recorded, and the deed of trust lien was not subordinated to the ease-
ment agreement. Following a foreclosure of the deed of trust, the motel
parcel was sold. The buyer testified that when he discovered that the drive-
in window for the restaurant was on his property, he promptly sought to
block access across his property. While the court correctly noted that fore-
closure of a valid deed of trust lien extinguished the subsequent easement
agreement, it also held that subsequent acts or conduct could ratify the ease-
ment.377 Accordingly, the court reversed summary judgment in favor of the
buyer because there was some evidence, "albeit circumstantial," to support
ratification. 378
The supporting evidence is, however, somewhat startling. The court con-
cluded that there was sufficient evidence because the owners of the restau-
rant and the motel and their customers had enjoyed free access across both
parcels since the grant of the easement. But this access is hardly surprising
since such access was the purpose of the cross easement, and until the fore-
closure of the prior deed of trust lien there was no argument between the
landowners as to whether the easement was in existence. Nonetheless, the
court held that this evidence tended to show use in accordance with the
easement, and that a purchaser is deemed to have knowledge of an easement
affecting property if it would be disclosed by an inspection of the prem-
ises.379 While this may be a generally correct statement of the law, its appli-
cability to a situation where an easement is extinguished by foreclosure of a
prior lien is, at best, doubtful. Thus, we must await the ensuing jury trial to
determine whether the buyer at foreclosure may block access to the drive-in
window.
The owner of the servient estate of an easement was more successful in a
summary judgment proceeding in Reyna v. Ayco Development Corp.380 A
child occupant of an apartment project was severely injured when she
opened an electrical switching cabinet located within an easement granted to
the City of Austin. Following settlement with the city, the landowner was
375. Id. at 418-19.
376. 784 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, n.w.h.).
377. Id. at 547.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 548.
380. 788 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied).
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sued on several negligence theories, all alleging a duty on the part of the
landowner to warn of and protect from the potentially dangerous condition
created by the switching cabinet. The court reviewed the express language
of the easement, which gave full control over the easement tract to the City
of Austin, and upheld summary judgment in favor of the landowner. 381 The
court held that while a landowner generally owes a duty of ordinary care,
that duty ceases when an owner has transferred possession or control to an-
other person.382 Here, the easement itself expressly surrendered exclusive
use and control of the property to the City of Austin, supplementing the
doctrine of general easement law that the owner of the dominant estate has a
duty to maintain and the owner of the servient estate has no right to
interfere. 383
XII. HOMESTEAD
During this Survey period various courts articulated several important
holdings: 1) that a homeowner's conveyance of his residence to a wholly-
owned corporation will not estop a subsequent homestead claim if the lender
had reason to suspect that the conveyance was less than absolute;384 2) that a
spouse's right to reinvest homestead proceeds is protected from the other
spouse's creditors, even if the other spouse abandons the homestead; 38 5 3)
that when a lender knows its loan will be used by the borrower to acquire a
business homestead, then the acquired property will be impressed with
homestead characteristics; 38 6 4) that to be entitled to claim a rural home-
stead exemption when property is located near an urban area, the landowner
must use the property as his residence and as a means of support;38 7 and 5)
that a divorce court's award to one spouse of an interest in a residence is not
sufficient to defeat the rights of a prior lienholder. 388
Matter of Rubarts389 arose when a bankrupt debtor asserted a homestead
claim to property that he had years earlier conveyed to his wholly-owned
corporation in order to collateralize a bank's loan to that corporation. In an
elegant and witty opinion, the Fifth Circuit reconciled some hoary Texas
authority390 in holding that a lender without actual knowledge that a con-
veyance was less than absolute is nevertheless barred from asserting estoppel
381. Id. at 724.
382. Id. (citing Prestonwood v. Taylor 728 S.W.2d 455, 460 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)).
383. Reyna, 788 S.W.2d at 724. The court cited two out-of-state decisions in support of its
position, but both of these decisions were cases where utility owners sought contribution from
a landowner for damage claims against the utility. Gnau v. Union Elec. Co., 672 S.W.2d 142
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Green v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 603, 290 S.E.2d 593 (1982).
384. Matter of Rubarts, 896 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1990).
385. Taylor v. Mosty Bros. Nursery, Inc., 777 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989,
n.w.h.).
386. In re Moore, 110 B.R. 255 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990).
387. In re Spencer, 109 B.R. 715 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
388. Boyd v. United Bank, N.A., 794 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1990, n.w.h.).
389. 896 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1990).




against a homestead claimant where the facts and circumstances are suffi-
cient to create suspicions in the mind of a reasonably prudent person. The
suspicious circumstances in Rubarts included the bank's knowledge that the
debtor and his family continued to occupy the house after the conveyance,
and the fact that the insurance policy covering the house (which named the
bank as a mortgagee and loss payee) continued to name the debtor as the
owner.
391
In Taylor v. Mosty Bros. Nursery, Inc. 392 the wife, whose husband aban-
doned his homestead (and, apparently, her), sought a declaratory judgment
that a judgment lien of her husband's creditor was ineffective against her
homestead. To her surprise, the trial court impressed a constructive trust in
the amount of the husband's debt against the proceeds from any future vol-
untary sale of the homestead attributable to the husband's abandoned home-
stead interest; the trial court, however, declined to order a forced sale of the
homestead. 393 The appeals court reversed the trial court and held that the
statutory six-month investment period 394 applies to each homestead claim-
ant for the entire proceeds from the sale of a homestead, even if one of the
claimants abandons the homestead. 395
The bank was taken to the cleaners in In re Moore.396 The borrower was
leasing space for his laundromat when he discovered a parcel of land on
which to construct a new laundromat. The bank made a loan for the pro-
ject, and the borrower executed a promissory note that was secured by a
vendor's lien and deed of trust lien against the land. The note evidenced
indebtedness that included the purchase price for the land, preexisting debt
of the borrower to the bank, and funds to construct the laundromat. The
borrower operated his laundromat in the leased space until the new laundro-
mat was completed. Thereafter, the borrower's business failed and he filed
for bankruptcy. The bank sought to have the stay lifted to permit foreclo-
sure of its liens against the laundromat, arguing the entire indebtedness was
secured by the bank's lien. The borrower, however, asserted that the new
laundromat was his business homestead when the bank's lien was placed on
the property and, therefore, only the indebtedness used to construct the new
laundromat was secured by the bank's lien.
Agreeing with the borrower, the bankruptcy court found that the bor-
rower acquired the new land intending to move permanently from the origi-
nal laundromat to the new laundromat and, therefore, the borrower had
abandoned his original business homestead as a matter of law when he
purchased the new land.397 Further, because the bank had notice of the
391. Rubarts, 896 F.2d at 113.
392. 777 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, n.w.h.).
393. Id. at 569.
394. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(c) (Vernon Supp. 1991). This subsection allows the
homestead claimant to reinvest, free of any creditor's claims, the proceeds from the sale of a
homestead into another homestead within six months after the sale.
395. Taylor, 777 S.W.2d at 570.
396. 110 B.R. 255 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990).
397. Id. at 257, 258 (citing Norman v. First Bank & Trust, Bryan, 557 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). This holding by the bankruptcy court
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borrower's intention to make the new land his business homestead, the prop-
erty was impressed with homestead characteristics when the bank's lien was
created. 398 Accordingly, the bank's lien could not secure the indebtedness
attributable to preexisting debt.399 Finally, because the borrower's spouse
did not sign the loan documents, the debt attributable to the construction
costs of the new laundromat also was unsecured.4° Thus, only the indebt-
edness used to acquire the land was secured by the bank's liens.4°1
In In re Spencer4°2 the debtors owned a tract of land located in and re-
ceiving some services from an incorporated city. In bankruptcy, the debtors
claimed a rural homestead exemption for the entire tract. The creditors re-
sponded by claiming that the property was urban and therefore entitled only
to the one-acre urbanhomestead exemption.4°3 The court held that a home-
stead is rural in two instances: first, if it cannot be classified as urban (for
instance, if it is not located near a developed city and does not receive serv-
ices from a city); and second, if notwithstanding the existence of some urban
characteristics, the property is used as a residence and as a means to support
the owner. 4 In this case, the property came within neither category, so the
debtors were entitled to claim only an urban homestead.4° 5
Boyd v. United Bank, N.A. 406 required the court to determine whether a
mortgagee's interest should be inferior to that of a party in possession of the
mortgaged property. After a divorce decree awarded husband and wife joint
ownership in residential real estate, the husband sought to consolidate his
debts by obtaining a bank loan secured by that real estate. The bank re-
quired either that the husband be sole owner of the property or that the wife
also join in the loan documents. Consequently, the husband and wife signed
an agreement in which the wife sold the husband all her interest in the prop-
erty, released all liens she had therein, and agreed to vacate before the sched-
uled closing date of the bank loan. In fact, the wife and her children were
still on the property when the loan closed. Several months later, by bill of
review, a divorce court awarded the wife a judgment against her husband,
secured by an equitable interest in the mortgaged property. Thereafter, the
reversed In re Moore, 93 B.R. 480 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988), which found that the bank's lien
was perfected before the borrower abandoned the prior homestead (the leased laundromat).
The court held the bank's lien, therefore, superior to the borrower's homestead claim. Id. at
483-84.
398. Moore, 110 B.R. at 258 (citing Hufstedler v. Glenn, 82 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1935, no writ)).
399. Moore, 110 B.R. at 258. The court noted that the homestead statute permits liens on
the homestead only for 1) purchase money, 2) taxes, and 3) work and material used in con-
structing improvements on the homestead if the work and material were contracted for in
writing by the homestead claimant (and, if married, the spouse) before the material is fur-
nished or the labor is performed. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
400. Moore, 110 B.R. at 258.
401. Id.
402. In re Spencer, 109 B.R. 715 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
403. A rural family homestead may consist of up to 200 acres; an urban homestead may
consist of up to one acre. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § § 41.002(a), (b)(l) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
404. In re Spencer, 109 B.R. at 717-18.
405. Id. at 718.
406. 794 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1990, n.w.h.).
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husband defaulted on his loan, and the wife sought to forestall a foreclosure
by arguing that the bank's lien amounted to an unlawful attempt to fix a lien
against a homestead. The trial court ruled in favor of the bank, and the
appeals court affirmed.4°7 The court acknowledged that a mortgagee may
acquire a lien inferior to possessor's interest.408 However, said the court,
such possession must be of such a character as to make it the mortgagee's
duty to inquire about the possessor's claim.44 9 Here, the wife knew her hus-
band intended to present the conveyance papers to the bank, and she took no
action to advise the bank of any inconsistent claim by her. To the contrary,
by deeding the property to her husband, she took steps to allay the bank's
curiosity about her claim. Under such circumstances, the bank had no duty
to inquire about the nature of her claim.410
407. Id. at 840.
408. Id. at 841 (citing Texas Life Ins. Co. v. Texas Bldg. Co., 307 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1957, no writ)).
409. Boyd, 794 S.W.2d at 841 (citing Sandoval v. Rattikin, 395 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
410. Boyd, 794 S.W.2d at 841.
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